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INVOLUNTARY IMPORTS:  WILLIAMS, LUTWAK, 
THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, 
FEDERALISM, AND “THICK” AND “THIN” 
CONCEPTIONS OF MARRIAGE 
Lynn D. Wardle* 
 
 Profound conflicts may arise when persons enter into a same-sex 
marriage in one jurisdiction where such marriages are permitted and then 
attempt to import that marital status into another jurisdiction where same-
sex marriage is not allowed.  The Supreme Court established the standards 
for horizontal (interstate) recognition of marital status in Williams v. North 
Carolina I and II and the standards for vertical (state-federal, or federal-
international) recognition of marriage were set in Lutwak v. United States.  
DOMA codifies both principles.   
 The 2012 First Circuit decision invalidating DOMA in Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services is criticized for 
misrepresenting the facts and misapplying federalism principles and 
equality precedent.  There are compelling justifications to protect the 
traditional “thick” conception of marriage as a gender-integrating 
institution rich with meaning and responsibility, and to reject the new 
“thin” conception of marriage with diminished requirements, duties, and 
more subjective content.  Courts should be resistant to letting political 
movements distort sound judicial analysis.  Prudence on the part of the 
same-sex movement, including an effort to accomplish its goals legislatively 
rather than through the courts, and respectful tolerance of differing views, 
may increase the value and longevity of this social movement’s 
contributions to the development of the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The interjurisdictional transportability of marriage status, particularly the 
attempted importation of same-sex marriage from jurisdictions in which it 
is permitted into a jurisdiction where it is prohibited, raises many profound 
and fascinating conflict of laws dilemmas.  Conceptually, it implicates 
delicate and serious concerns of sovereignty, comity, choice of law, full 
faith and credit, and constitutional allocations of regulatory power, 
including federalism.  More poignantly, the issue also has profound, and 
increasingly apparent, practical human dimensions.  The marriages of tens 
of thousands of same-sex couples who have legitimately married in a state 
that permits same-sex marriage may not be recognized in other states that 
do not permit or recognize same-sex marriage.  In addition to the 
complexity of the disparate recognition of marriages (a consistent, if 
 2012] INVOLUNTARY IMPORTS 773 
periodically controversial feature of the American legal landscape since at 
least 1789), and the frustrating policy controversy regarding whether same-
sex marriage should be legalized, is the practical vexation of the uncertainty 
whether other jurisdictions will recognize same-sex marriages when they 
are legally created in one state. 
Determining the legal rules that govern marriage validity and the 
recognition of foreign marriages is one of the most important tasks of 
lawmakers.  As Justice Jackson famously stated in his dissent in Estin v. 
Estin,1 “If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their 
lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether they 
are married and, if so, to whom.”2  Justice Jackson did not say that people 
are entitled to expect rules that will validate whatever marriages they 
contract, wherever they contract them, or with whomever they contract 
them.  Rather, he declared that the people are entitled to know the rules that 
will determine marriage validity and recognition.3  Such knowledge gives 
them the ability to plan their lives and structure their conduct with some 
significant measure of reliability and predictability. 
Same-sex couples, as well as government officials and all citizens, 
deserve to know what the interjurisdictional recognition rules are, wholly 
apart from whether they like them or dislike them.  Congress attempted to 
address those concerns in 1996 when it enacted the Defense of Marriage 
Act4 (DOMA), one of the key purposes of which was to clarify with bright-
line lucidity the rules governing interstate and federal-state recognition of 
same-sex marriages.  Today, ironically, DOMA itself is shrouded with 
uncertainty due to both political and litigation challenges. 
This Article considers the dilemma of the involuntary importation of 
controversial forms of marriage into another state; forcing states to 
recognize same-sex marriages is the specific case-in-point.  This Article has 
several parts and purposes.  The connecting themes are the importance of 
the transportability of marital status, the importance of marital relationships, 
and the importance of making legal judgments and policies the right way—
that is, by adhering to the rules laid down, by giving due regard to both the 
federalist sovereignty of different jurisdictions and the differing 
responsibilities of the different branches of government, and by respecting 
and following the structural and procedural allocations of governmental 
decision-making authority. 
Part I considers the transportability of marriage status generally, paying 
particular attention to the attempt to import same-sex marriage from 
jurisdictions in which it is permitted into jurisdictions where it is not.  The 
conceptual and legal significance of this issue for society and our legal 
 
 1. 334 U.S. 541 (1948). 
 2. Id. at 553 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 3. See id. at 553–54. 
 4. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). 
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system is noted, and the practical significance of this issue for individuals 
and families is indicated as well. 
Part II discusses transportability of marital status issues in the particular 
context of the United States.  It considers the seminal U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions in Williams v. North Carolina I5 and II,6 and the principle of 
federalism in family law.  It also reviews the Court’s decision in Lutwak v. 
United States7 from nearly sixty years ago, which clarified that 
congressional intent governs the meaning of, and requirements for, valid 
marriages for purposes of interpreting federal law.   
Part III then reviews DOMA, particularly section 3, and considers 
whether Congress’s explicit legislative proclamation that same-sex unions 
are not deemed marriages for purposes of federal law even if they are 
deemed valid marriages in some states violates constitutional principles of 
federalism. 
Next, Part IV discusses Congressional efforts to repeal DOMA and 
litigation efforts to have DOMA declared unconstitutional.  It first notes 
some significant errors in the First Circuit opinion that invalidated DOMA, 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services.8  Next, it 
discusses some of the powerful reasons why certain states justifiably insist 
that marriage is exclusively the union of a man and a woman (herein 
“marriage” or “traditional marriage”), and does not include the union of two 
persons of the same gender (herein “same-sex unions” or “same-sex 
marriage”), including some of the reasons why the “thick,”9 historical 
understanding of the meaning of marriage deserves and requires unique, 
special protection and exclusive recognition in our law, and why the “thin” 
conception of marriage that seems to be increasingly popular in some 
quarters of American culture today is wholly inadequate for the critical 
needs of families and society.  The profound implications of federal 
legalization of same-sex marriage and the resulting forced recognition of 
same-sex marriages by the states, in violation of the core principles of 
federalism, are also discussed. 
The conclusion suggests that same-sex marriage politics, just like 
abortion politics over the past forty years, exerts a distorting influence upon 
the rule of law and the performance of courts.  Accordingly, it is especially 
important that courts guard against such political influences by giving the 
proper degree of respect and deference to the democratically elected 
legislative and executive branches, as required in our republican form of 
government.  Likewise, it is important in the debate of these issues to show 
decency and respect for differing views and to protect and foster the 
expression of competing values and perspectives.  
 
 5. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
 6. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
 7. 344 U.S. 604 (1953). 
 8. 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 9. For a discussion of this term, see infra Part IV.E. 
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I.  THE TRANSPORTABILITY OF MARITAL STATUS AND THE PROBLEM OF 
“INVOLUNTARY IMPORTS” 
Part I examines the transportability of marriage generally, and of same-
sex marriage specifically.  While the general transportability of marriage 
plays an important role in our society, the transportability of same-sex 
marriage from jurisdictions where it is permitted to those where it is not 
presents significant legal and conceptual issues for society, the legal 
system, and individuals and families. 
A.  The Transportability of Marital Status Generally 
It is reasonable for persons in domestic relationships to want their public 
relationship status to be fully transportable from their home to other 
jurisdictions.  People moving across borders from one jurisdiction to 
another usually desire and expect that the marital status they enjoy in their 
home jurisdiction will travel with them.  This is not only true 
internationally, but is also true within any one nation that has internal semi-
sovereign states or provinces in which marriage regulations vary, such as 
the United States.10 
Of course, it is also sometimes true that people seek to escape the marital 
status or rules of their home jurisdiction.  Consequently, people sometimes 
travel away from their state of residence to another state for the very 
purpose of evading the marriage law of their home jurisdiction and entering 
into a marriage allowed in a foreign jurisdiction that was prohibited in their 
home state.  In recent years, the flood of same-sex couples into various 
jurisdictions that have legalized same-sex marriage is a prime example.11  It 
is estimated that one-third of the approximately 7,500–15,000 same-sex 
couples who have married in Canada have come from other nations.12  
Other nations and states that have legalized same-sex marriage have 
 
 10. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional 
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1969 (1997) (explaining that generally “every 
state recognizes the validity of a marriage valid where it was celebrated”); see also Evan 
Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Defects in the “Defense of 
Marriage” Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 221, 221–22 (1996) (arguing that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Constitution guarantees that a marriage in one state will be recognized 
in another). 
 11. Cynthia M. Reed, When Love, Comity, and Justice Conquer Borders:  INS 
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 115 (1996) (“After 
the Baehr decision, people joked that ‘[i]f [the legalization of same-sex marriage] happens in 
Hawaii, gay and lesbian people will sink the island. . . .  We will all arrive the same day, get 
married, and the island will just go under.’” (quoting Brad L. Graham, Lesbian Couple is 
Wed—Sort Of, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 2, 1994, at 5f)). 
 12. Enjoli Liston, 5,000 Canadian Same-Sex Marriages “Not Valid,” INDEPENDENT 
(London) (Jan. 13, 2012), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/5000-canadian-
samesex-marriages-not-valid-6288971.html (indicating that 15,000 same-sex marriages were 
performed in Canada since 2004, one-third of which involved foreign couples); see also 
David Ljunggren, Canada Says Marriages of Foreign Gays Invalid, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2012, 
4:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/12/us-marriage-idUSTRE80B20U2012
0112 (indicating that 7,500 same-sex marriages were performed in Canada since 2003, one-
third of which involved foreign couples). 
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experienced similar influxes of foreigners from jurisdictions that do not 
allow same-sex marriage seeking to enter into such marriages.13  Indeed, 
one of the common arguments made for legalizing same-sex marriage in a 
particular jurisdiction is the economic benefits that will come from, among 
other things, the tourism from same-sex couples traveling from the many 
jurisdictions that forbid same-sex marriage.14  Thus, transjurisdictional 
movement to obtain a same-sex marriage, and its role in the legalization 
debate, is significant and growing. 
Marriages are of such profound importance to public interests that all 
states regulate marriage.  State control of domestic relations under the U.S. 
Constitution demonstrates the importance of having family law reflect local 
values about how the basic unit of society should be structured and 
regulated.15  Under our federal system, lawmakers in each state set 
boundaries defining what relationships they will and will not allow as 
marriages contracted in the state, subject to a few baseline constitutional 
conditions.  As such, no state has a completely open-door policy when it 
comes to marriage recognition, and all states prohibit and restrict certain 
 
 13. In 2008, the Williams Institute at UCLA predicted that 67,513 same-sex couples 
would travel to California to get married after the state supreme court legalized same-sex 
marriage. See Brad Sears & M.V. Badgett, The Impact of Extending Marriage to Same-Sex 
Couples on the California Budget, WILLIAMS INST., 2 (June 2008), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Sears-Badgett-EconImpact-CA-
Marriage-June-2008.pdf.  Relatively few out-of-state same-sex couples were married in 
Massachusetts, even though it was the first state to legalize (by judicial decree) same-sex 
marriage, because Massachusetts had a state law forbidding persons to enter into marriages 
that were forbidden in their home states. See id. at 6.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court upheld this law in Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health. 844 N.E.2d 623 
(Mass. 2006).  This restriction was subsequently repealed, however, in 2008. See Michael 
Levenson, Governor Signs Law Allowing Out-of-State Gays to Wed, BOSTON.COM (July 31, 
2008, 1:10 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2008/07/gov_to_
sign_bil.html.  Likewise, in the Netherlands, the first nation to legalize same-sex marriage, 
marriage-tourism has not been great because at least one partner must be Dutch or have 
Dutch residency status in order to enter into a marriage (same-sex or heterosexual). See 
Marriage Overseas, AUSTRALIAN MARRIAGE EQUALITY, http://www.australianmarriage
equality.com/international.htm#Netherlands (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 14. See, e.g., M.V. Lee Badgett et al., The Impact on Iowa’s Budget of Allowing Same-
Sex Couples to Marry, WILLIAMS INST., 1 (Apr. 2008), http://williamsinstitute.law.
ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Badgett-Sears-Baumle-Romero-Sears-IowaFiscalImpact-Apr-
2008.pdf (“[W]e estimate that allowing same-sex couples to marry will result in a net gain of 
approximately $5.3 million each year for the State.”); Angeliki Kastanis et al., The Economic 
Impact of Extending Marriage to Same-Sex Couples in Washington State, WILLIAMS INST., 1 
(2012), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Kastanis-Badgett-Herman-
WASalesTaxImpact-Jan-20121.pdf (estimating that “spending on wedding arrangements and 
tourism by resident same-sex couples and their guests will add an estimated $88 million 
boost to the state and local economy of Washington over the course of three years, with a 
$57 million boost in the first year alone”); Marriage Equality Offers Economic Advantages, 
ACLU ME. (Feb. 13, 2009), https://www.aclumaine.org/node/86 (noting that the Williams 
Institute study “also calculates that the direct spending on weddings and tourism will 
generate $3.1 million in local and state tax revenues”). 
 15. See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text; see also Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, 
Federalism and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 226–49 
(2005) (reviewing the history of federalism in family law). 
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marriages, thereby reflecting strong local policies.  Moreover, all states also 
draw boundary lines for the recognition of marriages contracted out-of-
jurisdiction.  Usually these marriage recognition rules closely reflect the 
major boundary lines of the domestic marriage definition rules, and 
implicate matters of significant public policy.16  The dilemma of disparate 
treatment of marriage by different states is just one of many examples of the 
price of decentralization and federalism in family law.  As Justice Murphy, 
dissenting in Williams I, put it: 
There is an element of tragic incongruity in the fact that an individual may 
be validly divorced in one state but not in another.  But our dual system of 
government and the fact that we have no uniform laws on many subjects 
give rise to other incongruities as well—for example, the common law 
took the logical position that an individual could have but one domicile at 
a time, but this Court has nevertheless said that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not prevent conflicting state decisions on the question of an 
individual’s domicile. . . .  In the absence of a uniform law on the subject 
of divorce, this Court is not so limited in its application of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause that it must force Nevada’s policy upon North Carolina, 
any more than it must compel Nevada to accept North Carolina’s 
requirements.  The fair result is to leave each free to regulate within its 
own area the rights of its own citizens.17 
In other words, under our federal system of government, couples may 
properly and fairly be deemed married or divorced in one American 
jurisdiction but not in another. 
B.  The Practical Significance of Same-Sex Marriage:  Transportability 
Same-sex marriage is one of the dominant public policy and political 
battles being fought today in the United States and around the world.  The 
movement to legalize same-sex marriage has acquired some significant 
political and social momentum in the United States and some foreign 
nations.18  As more states and nations recognize same-sex marriage, the 
 
 16. See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors:  Implications for 
Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147 
(1998); L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex 
“Marriage”:  How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
29 (1998); Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage:  Comity Versus Public 
Policy in Inter-jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations, 2008 BYU 
L. REV. 1855. 
 17. Williams I, 317 U.S. 287, 311 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
 18. For instance, President Obama has publicly declared his support for same-sex 
marriage, and the official platform of the Democratic party—the largest political party in 
America and the party that controls the White House and Senate—also endorsed the 
legalization of same-sex marriage. See Matt Compton, President Obama Supports Same-Sex 
Marriage, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 9, 2012, 6:12 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2012/05/09/president-obama-supports-same-sex-marriage; 2012 Democratic National 
Platform:  Moving America Forward, DEMOCRATS.ORG, http://www.democrats.org/
democratic-national-platform (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“[The Democratic Party] 
support[s] marriage equality and support[s] the movement to secure equal treatment under 
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potential for more same-sex marriages to be formed, and ultimately 
transported into other jurisdictions with conflicting marriage policies, 
increases. 
As the Appendix shows, same-sex marriage is currently allowed in six 
American states and the District of Columbia.19  Two other state 
legislatures (in Maryland and Washington) have enacted laws to allow 
same-sex marriage that have not yet taken effect and will be subject to 
possible voter veto in November 2012; meanwhile, voters in Maine will 
decide whether to pass a petition that would legalize same-sex marriage.20  
Ten other states have legalized marriage-equivalent same-sex civil unions, 
which present potentially similar interjursidictional domestic status 
transportability issues.21  Internationally, at least ten sovereign nations (of 
193) have legalized same-sex marriage, and sixteen other countries have 
legalized marriage-equivalent relationships (called “domestic partnership,” 
“civil unions,” “pactes civiles,” etc.).22  As the number of these jurisdictions 
increases (and they have grown from zero less than fifteen years ago), the 
incidence of controversies regarding transportability of this marital status 
will also increase. 
On the other hand, as the Appendix also shows, thirty-one U.S. states and 
at least forty-six foreign nations have provisions in, or have adopted 
amendments to, their state or national constitutions that facially appear to 
ban same-sex marriages.23  This underscores the highly controversial and 
intense nature of the issues that may arise when the prospect of unwelcome 
importation of same-sex marriage or civil union status is presented in a 
jurisdiction where citizens oppose such domestic relationships. 
As the number of jurisdictions permitting same-sex marriage increases, 
the number of same-sex marriages is also bound to increase.  Because 
globalization of the economy, family, travel, and communication provides 
incentives for people to move from one state or nation to another, the issue 
of whether nations that prohibit same-sex marriage will recognize the 
imported marriage status of same-sex couples who migrate within their 
borders will inevitably arise with increasing frequency in the years ahead.  
Thus, resolution of this issue may implicate the domestic lives and marital 
statuses of perhaps tens of thousands of legally married same-sex couples. 
 
law for same-sex couples.”).  The recently elected government of France and the government 
of New Zealand have also announced their intentions to legalize same-sex marriage. See 
Nick Perry, New Zealand Gay Marriage:  1st Stage of New Law Passed, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 29, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/29/new-zealand-gay-
marriage-_n_1839488.html; France to Legalise Gay Marriage in 2013, FRANCE 24, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20120629-french-government-legalise-gay-marriage-2013-
homosexual-bertinotti (last updated Oct. 20, 2012). 
 19. See infra Appendix A. 
 20. See infra Appendix A n.243.  
 21. See infra Appendix A. 
 22. See infra Appendix C. 
 23. See infra Appendix B and D. 
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Although it is impossible to pinpoint the exact number of married same-
sex couples residing in the United States, the number is clearly not 
insubstantial.  For example, in the 2010 U.S. Census over 130,000 same-sex 
couples reported that they were married.24  By comparison, the Williams 
Institute reported in November 2011 that 46,755 same-sex couples 
(including 32,487 resident couples) had been married in six states and the 
District of Columbia, and that “approximately 80,000 [same-sex couples] 
are married nationwide,” including those who may have “married in Canada 
or another country.”25  Even discounting for evasive marriages and other 
marriages of possibly dubious validity,26 at least 32,487 same-sex couples 
appear to have good claims to same-sex marriages that are valid in their 
domicile state of celebration, which makes their claim to transportability of 
their marital status substantial.  The total number of presumably valid same-
sex marriages (32,487) may not seem particularly impressive when 
compared to the total number of American married-couple households 
(55,704,781),27 but this is just the tip of the iceberg; and for many if not 
 
 24. Census:  131,729 Gay Couples Report They’re Married, NPR.ORG (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/09/27/140859242/census-131-729-gay-couples-report-theyre-
married (preliminarily reporting that 131,729 same-sex couples recorded themselves as 
being married on the 2010 Census).  While some of those marriages might not meet the 
requirements of non-evasive and legitimate, it is not unreasonable to assume that many of 
them do. 
 25. M.V. Lee Badgett & Jody L. Herman, Patterns of Relationships Recognition by 
Same-Sex Couples in the United States, WILLIAMS INST. 4–6 (2011), http://williams
institute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Badgett-Herman-Marriage-Dissolution-Nov-
2011.pdf.  In four of the six states that reported on residency of the parties who married, 41 
percent or less of the marriages were of residents of the state, so a significant percentage of 
the same-sex marriages in the United States may be evasive marriages, the validity of which 
is variable from state-to-state, and very uncertain. See id. at 4. 
 26. In the United States, the prevailing choice of law rule is that marriage validity is 
generally governed by the law of the place of celebration; but if another state has the most 
significant relationship to the parties and the marriage at the time of the marriage and also 
has a very strong public policy implicated by the marriage, the law of the place of 
celebration will give way to the law of the state with the most significant relationship. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971); see also infra note 51 and 
accompanying text.  Thus, “evasive” marriages, even though apparently valid by the law of 
the place where the marriage was celebrated, might not be deemed valid if they would be 
invalid by the law of the parties’ common domicile, for example. See generally Andrew 
Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions:  A Handbook 
for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143 (2005). 
 27. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States, 2010 American Community 
Survey 1-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_10_1YR_DP02&prodType=table 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012); see also Marital Status, 2010 American Community Survey 1-
Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/
jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_10_1YR_S1201&prodType=table (last visited Oct. 
20, 2012) (48.8 percent of 248,055,946 Americans aged 15 and older are married). But see 
Sabrina Tavernise, Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority, Census Finds, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 26, 2011, at A22 (“Married couples have dropped below half of all American 
households for the first time, the Census Bureau says . . . .  Married couples represented just 
48 percent of American households in 2010, according to data being made public Thursday 
and analyzed by the Brookings Institution.  This was slightly less than in 2000, but far below 
the 78 percent of households occupied by married couples in 1950.”). 
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most of those nearly 65,000 individuals in apparently valid same-sex 
marriages, the transportability issue is extremely profound.  Thus, the issue 
of transportability of same-sex marriage status is not merely one of abstract 
intellectual curiosity or remote scholarly speculation.  It is currently very 
important to potentially tens of thousands of same-sex couples, not to 
mention their families (including, in many cases, children).28 
II.  THE TRANSPORTABILITY OF MARITAL STATUS, AMERICAN-STYLE 
Part II examines issues raised by the transportability of marriage status 
within the United States.  It first considers the meaning of federalism in 
family law in light of the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Williams I 
and II.  It then discusses the Court’s decision in Lutwak, which clarified that 
congressional intent governs the meaning and requirements of valid 
marriages under federal law. 
A.  Williams I and II and the Importance of the 
Transportability of Marital Status 
Legal policies that affect the transportability of marital status from one 
jurisdiction to another touch upon very sensitive and, at times, very political 
issues.  Such issues are hardly new and their importance has long been 
apparent.  For example, seven decades ago the Supreme Court considered 
(in two separate decisions at two stages of one case) the transportability of 
marital status issue in the divorce context when it decided Williams I and 
II.29  The cases involved two sequential prosecutions of a man and woman 
from a small town in rural North Carolina.  These individuals left their 
respective spouses, traveled to Nevada where they obtained a “quickie” 
divorce, married each other, then returned to North Carolina where they 
were ultimately convicted of bigamy.  The defendants raised their Nevada 
divorce decree in defense, to show that their marriage to each other did not 
overlap with their marriages to their former spouses.  The defendants were 
ultimately convicted, however, as the North Carolina court concluded that 
the new state of an abandoning spouse lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
divorce—jurisdiction instead belonged to the state where the parties had 
been married and where the abandoned spouse still resided.30 
In Williams I, decided in 1942, the Court held that North Carolina courts 
hearing a bigamy prosecution would be required to respect divorce 
 
 28. See Susan Donaldson James, Census 2010:  One-Quarter of Gay Couples Raising 
Children, ABC NEWS (June 23, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/sex-couples-census-
data-trickles-quarter-raising-children/story?id=13850332&page=2#.T9dh88Xhd9Q  
(reporting that the Williams Institute suggests that more than 250,000 children are being 
raised by lesbian and gay parents, 19 percent of such couples are adopting, but 80 percent of 
the children are not adopted). 
 29. Williams II, 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945); Williams I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). See 
generally Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex 
Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187 (1998). 
 30. North Carolina v. Williams, 17 S.E.2d 769, 777–78 (N.C. 1941), rev’d, Williams I, 
317 U.S. 287. 
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judgments issued by a Nevada court if it had jurisdiction to grant divorce by 
virtue of the domicile of at least one of the parties, regardless of 
abandonment.  This was the case even though the parties seeking the 
divorces in Nevada had long before resided in North Carolina—where they 
had married, lived with, and abandoned their spouses, and where their 
abandoned spouses and families still resided—and even though the grounds 
for divorce in Nevada were very permissive and inconsistent with the 
stricter divorce law of North Carolina. 
Justice Douglas wrote a very strong majority opinion emphasizing that 
the differences in the divorce laws did not justify refusal to recognize and 
respect divorce judgments from Nevada courts that had proper jurisdiction.  
Accordingly, the Court reversed the bigamy convictions and remanded the 
case to North Carolina.31  Justice Frankfurter filed a cautionary concurring 
opinion,32 and Justices Murphy33 and Jackson34 penned blistering dissents 
emphasizing the feeble connection the defendants had with Nevada when 
they filed for divorce there, and the “acute interest to all the states of the 
Union and on which they hold varying and sharply divergent views, [of] the 
problem of how they shall treat the marriage relation.”35  Justice Jackson 
added: 
I cannot join in exerting the judicial power of the Federal Government to 
compel the State of North Carolina to subordinate its own law to the 
Nevada divorce decrees.  The Court’s decision to do so . . . nullifies the 
power of each state to protect its own citizens against dissolution of their 
marriages by the courts of other states which have an easier system of 
divorce.  It subjects every marriage to a new infirmity, in that one 
dissatisfied spouse may choose a state of easy divorce, in which neither 
party has ever lived, and there commence proceedings without personal 
service of process.36 
The concurring and dissenting justices provided the blueprint for the 
ultimate decision in Williams II just three years later. 
Upon remand the parties again were convicted of bigamy, and those 
convictions were affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court.  Again the 
defendants sought certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the case went 
before the Court for a second review.  In 1945, in Williams II,37 the 
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the refusal of the North 
Carolina court to recognize the defendants’ Nevada divorce decrees.  The 
Court observed that the parties had merely lived in a Nevada motel for the 
minimum six weeks required by Nevada before filing for divorce, and they 
had returned to North Carolina immediately upon receipt of their respective 
 
 31. Williams I 317 U.S. at 304. 
 32. Id. at 304 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 33. Id. at 308 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 311 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. at 308 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 311 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 37. Williams II, 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945). 
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divorces.38  The Court agreed with the North Carolina courts below that for 
a court to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination of marital 
status, the domicile of at least one of the married parties must be located in 
the state of divorce.  Furthermore, six weeks in a motel in a new state 
followed by a hasty return to the former state of residence did not suffice to 
show the constitutionally required “domicile” connection between the state 
and the married parties to empower the new state to dissolve the marital 
relationship.39  The dissenting justices in Williams I were in the majority in 
Williams II, and Justice Frankfurter, author of the cautionary concurrence in 
Williams I, wrote the majority opinion for the Court in Williams II. 
In both cases, the Court and dissenting justices emphasized the interests 
that the respective states had in the application of their own laws to 
determine marital status,40 underscoring the conflicting state interests in 
issues concerning the transportability of marital status.  In both cases, the 
Court followed the “possession is nine-tenths of the law” axiom; that is, 
only a state that “possesses” the parties and their marital relationship—by 
virtue of being the true domicile of at least one of the parties to the 
marriage—has jurisdiction to adjudicate petitions for divorce.41  
Presumably, this is because such states at that time had the predominant 
state interest in the proceeding, both in terms of quality and magnitude.  
Also, these states are the most likely to be visited with the potential costly 
and burdensome social consequences of the divorce, such as the medical, 
emotional, and economic consequences for the parties for which the state 
might be responsible.42 
In other words, the Court decided that the state with the greatest apparent 
interest in deciding the issue of modification of marital status by virtue of 
domicile connection of one or both parties had the power to adjudicate the 
issue, and such determination by a court with jurisdiction was transportable 
to and would have to be recognized in other states (at least in the absence of 
any congressional direction otherwise).  This was a clear deviation from the 
very loose “minimum contacts” standard for jurisdiction established just a 
few days after Williams II in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,43 based 
upon a test that might be compared to the subsequently popular “most 
significant relationship” test for choice-of-law.44  Most importantly for this 
Article, the Williams cases illustrate that the issue of transportability of 
 
 38. See id. at 241. 
 39. Id. at 241–42. 
 40. Id. at 241; see also Williams I, 317 U.S. at 308–09 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 41. See Williams II, 325 U.S. at 241; see also Williams I, 317 U.S. at 308–09. 
 42. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a Woman, 
83 N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1369–70 (2007) (“People are vulnerable in marriages, and when 
marriages fail, society must pick up the pieces and the public incurs social costs such as for 
increased mental health treatment, medical services, juvenile delinquency, impaired 
education, and reduced labor productivity.”). 
 43. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 283 (1971).  The interest 
analysis revolution in American choice of law occurred more than a decade after the 
Supreme Court decided Williams II. 
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marital status has long been important and divisive in American 
constitutional and marriage law jurisprudence. 
B.  Federalism, Vertical Marriage Recognition Law, 
and Lutwak v. United States 
The Williams cases, and most controversies regarding importation or 
exportation of marital status from one jurisdiction to another, arise in a 
“horizontal” dispute.  The “horizontal” issue is whether marital status 
created or terminated in one state or nation will be recognized in another 
state or nation of coequal sovereignty.  In nations that have a federal 
system,45 such as the United States, the issue of the transportability of 
marital status also arises regularly in the “vertical” context, in which the 
national government must decide whether to recognize a marital status 
created or dissolved by a particular state or province, or vice versa. 
Generally, the federal government and its agencies adopt and incorporate 
state marital status determinations because the direct regulation of domestic 
relations under the U.S. Constitution is left to the control and authority of 
the states.  As the Supreme Court noted in Sosna v. Iowa,46 “Regulation of 
domestic relations [is] an area that has long been regarded as a virtually 
exclusive province of the States.”47  Thus, on the principle of comity, based 
on respect for the reserved sovereign power of the states to regulate 
domestic relations, and probably based on recognition that federal agents 
and agencies lack as much experience and competence as state authorities 
in regulating domestic relations, federal courts have long presumed that 
Congress intended references to domestic relations in federal law to 
incorporate state domestic relations law.  Federal deference to state 
domestic relations law, however, is not absolute.  As the Supreme Court 
noted in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,48 “On the rare occasion when state 
family law has come into conflict with the federal statute, this Court has 
limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether 
Congress has ‘positively required by direct enactment’ that state law be 
pre-empted.”49  Similarly, the Court reiterated in McCarty v. McCarty50 that 
“[s]tate family and family-property law must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear 
and substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand 
that state law be overridden.”51 
Congress’s authority to enact domestic relations legislation that 
contradicts, supersedes, and overrides state domestic relation law is clear.  
 
 45. See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (discussing international federalism). 
 46. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). 
 47. Id. at 404; see also Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 
502 (1982); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 
(1858). 
 48. 439 U.S. 572 (1979). 
 49. Id. at 581 (citing Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)). 
 50. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). 
 51. Id. at 220 (1981) (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); In re 
Burrus, 136 US 586, 593–594 (1890)). 
 784 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
In fact, in both Hisquierdo and McCarty the Court concluded that federal 
statutes and rules governing the interests of family members in federal 
benefits were inconsistent with state domestic relations laws, and, as a 
result, superseded and replaced those state domestic relations laws for 
purposes of determining the federal benefits. 
Thus, just as the states have the constitutional sovereign authority to 
regulate domestic relations, the national government has the constitutional 
sovereign authority and responsibility to regulate certain areas, such as 
federal taxation, the military, commerce.  As to those subjects over which 
the federal government exercises sovereign control, Congress has the 
authority to refuse to recognize marital and other domestic status 
determinations of the states in the rational regulation of those subjects.52  At 
present, Congress has chosen to reject, limit, and qualify the transportability 
of marital status created by the states into federal law in some cases, based 
on consideration of such factors as the need for national uniformity, ease of 
application, concerns over federalism (including the controversial or 
negative impact upon the federal government or program, or upon other 
states), and the attainment of numerous substantive national policy 
objectives.53 
Lutwak, decided six decades ago, illustrates both horizontal and vertical 
marriage validity choice of law issues and principles.  Lutwak concerned 
the alleged “green card” marriages of three Polish refugees (two brothers 
and the wife or former wife of one of them) who were living in France as 
refugees following World War II.  The brothers’ sister, who was married 
and living in Illinois, allegedly arranged for three honorably discharged 
veterans—two women and one man—to travel to Paris, contract pretend 
marriages with the three refugee relatives, and then bring them into the 
United States under the War Brides Act.  As allegedly conspired, the three 
refugees and their spouses celebrated their marriages properly in France, 
but never consummated their marriages nor lived together in the United 
 
 52. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act:  
Deciding, Democracy, and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 951 (2010) [hereinafter 
Wardle, Section Three of DOMA]; Lynn D. Wardle, Who Decides?:  The Federal 
Architecture of DOMA and Comparative Marriage Recognition, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 143 
(2010) [hereinafter Wardle, Who Decides?].  
 53. See Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy:  The Early Tradition of Federal 
Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1767 (2005) 
(arguing that the federal government was actively regulating family relations prior to the 
Civil War); Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism:  Divorce and the Constitution, 16 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 390–92, 407, 430 (2007) (examining federalism in divorce 
jurisdiction doctrine); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1379–86 (1998) (arguing that the federal government has heavily 
regulated domestic relations since Reconstruction); Lynn D. Wardle, State Marriage 
Amendments:  Developments, Precedents, and Significance, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 403, 
432 (2005) (explaining that federalism in the family promotes local and minority interests, 
pluralism, and diversity); Wardle, supra note 15, at 233–346 (providing a history of 
federalism in family law). See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12–18 (1996), reprinted 
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905 (analyzing the governmental interests advanced by the Act). 
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States.54  They were all convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United 
States and of violating federal immigration laws by virtue of their gaining 
priority entrance into the United States on the basis of their apparent 
“sham” marriages. 
The convicted defendants argued that their marriages were valid and 
persuaded the three dissenting Justices in the case.  Joined by Justices Black 
and Frankfurter, Justice Jackson wrote a dissent in which he argued,  
“These marriages were formally contracted in France, and there is no 
contention that they were forbidden or illegal there for any reason.”55  He 
added, “We start with marriages that either are valid or at least have not 
been proved to be invalid in their inception. . . .  If the parties are validly 
married, even though the marriage is a sordid one, we should suppose that 
would end the case.”56  Thus, the dissenters invoked horizontal marriage 
recognition between France and the United States. 
Justice Minton, writing for the majority, acknowledged the petitioners’ 
“claim that the trial court erred in presuming that the French law relating to 
the validity of marriages is the same as American law, and [that] they 
further contend that even under American law these marriages are valid.”57  
Thus, as a matter of horizontal marriage law, the dissenters asserted that if 
the marriages were valid under French law, the general American choice of 
law rule regarding marriage validity, lex loci celebrationis (the law of the 
place of celebration) and respect for the coequal sovereignty of France 
required the courts of the United States to respect and recognize the validity 
of those marriages.  As a matter of vertical choice of law, the petitioners 
also argued that, under the law of the relevant American states, their 
marriages were valid (perhaps because those states would recognize the 
validity of the French marriages).58  Therefore, the United States was also 
obliged to recognize the validity of the marriages as a matter of 
federalism.59 
The six Justices in the majority rejected those arguments:  “We do not 
believe that the validity of the marriages is material. . . .  We consider the 
marriage ceremonies only as a part of the conspiracy to defraud the United 
 
 54. One couple divorced immediately, another’s divorce was pending when this case 
was tried, and the third couple separated immediately and remained apart for two years until 
the prosecution in this case commenced. Id. at 606, 609. 
 55. Id. at 620 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 610 (majority opinion) (explaining 
that “[a]t the trial, it was undisputed that [the parties] had gone through formal marriage 
ceremonies”). 
 56. Id. at 620–21 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 611 (majority opinion); see also id. at 610 (“Petitioners contended that, 
regardless of the intentions of the parties at the time of the ceremonies, the fact that the 
ceremonies were performed was sufficient to establish the validity of the marriages, at least 
until the Government proved their invalidity under French law.  They relied on the general 
American rule of conflict of laws that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere 
unless it is incestuous, polygamous, or otherwise declared void by statute.”). 
 58. See id. at 610–11. 
 59. See id. 
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States and to commit offenses against the United States.”60  For the 
majority, the issue was one of vertical (federal-state) marriage recognition.  
The controlling law was U.S. federal immigration and criminal conspiracy 
laws, not Illinois or French marriage laws.61  The definition of marriage for 
purposes of interpreting the federal immigration laws was entirely a matter 
for Congress to determine.  Thus, the case turned on the intent of Congress, 
and the Court was obliged to follow Congress’s instruction about what kind 
of marriages were to be recognized for purposes of federal immigration and 
related criminal conspiracy laws.  The Court observed: 
By directing in the War Brides Act that ‘alien spouses’ of citizen war 
veterans should be admitted into this country, Congress intended to make 
it possible for veterans who had married aliens to have their families join 
them in this country without the long delay involved in qualifying under 
the proper immigration quota.  Congress did not intend to provide aliens 
with an easy means of circumventing the quota system by fake marriages 
. . . .  The common understanding of a marriage, which Congress must 
have had in mind when it made provision for ‘alien spouses’ . . . is that 
the two parties have undertaken to establish a life together and assume 
certain duties and obligations.62 
Lutwak continues to be not only good law, but also a definitive affirmation 
and example of the power that Congress and the federal government 
generally have to define and regulate marriage for purposes of federal 
law.63 
That approach was hardly novel in 1953 when Lutwak was decided.  
Judicial deference to congressional intent regarding the legal meaning and 
consequences of domestic relations status in federal law has a federal court 
pedigree as old as the United States itself.64  An abundance of recent 
scholarship (some of it concerning the legal rights of women and 
minorities) has shown that the exercise of federal authority to define 
 
 60. Id. at 611. 
 61. See id. (“No one is being prosecuted for an offense against the marital relation.”). 
But see id. at 620–21 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (explaining that the validity of the marriage 
“goes to the very existence of an offense” because if the marriages “were merely voidable 
and had not been adjudged void at the time of the entry into this country, it was not a fraud 
to represent them as subsisting”). 
 62. Id. (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 63. See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage:  Immigration Rules and Their 
Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 537, 543 n.15 (2010) (noting that Lutwak still controls); Marcel De Armas, Comment, 
For Richer or Poorer or Any Other Reason:  Adjudicating Immigration Marriage Fraud 
Cases Within the Scope of the Constitution, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 743, 753–
54 (2007) (advocating the Lutwak test for foreign marriage validity). But see Joseph A. Pull, 
Questioning the Fundamental Right to Marry, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 43–44 (2006) (arguing 
that the right to marry should override Lutwak). 
 64. See Wardle, Section Three of DOMA, supra note 52, at 974–81 (citing cases back to 
the mid-1800s and congressional legislation back to the eighteenth century); see also United 
States v. Yum, 776 F.2d 490, 492 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lozano, 511 F.2d 1, 5 
(7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 269–71 (9th Cir. 1970); United States 
v. Elzahabi, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123–24 (D. Minn. 2007). 
 2012] INVOLUNTARY IMPORTS 787 
domestic relations and the legal incidents thereof for purposes of federal 
law is traceable to the earliest days of the new American republic.65  For 
example, by delving into historical sources of the pre-Civil War era, Kristin 
Collins has shown “how national-level actors of that period exercised their 
authority to regulate and adjudicate matters involving domestic relations.”66  
Her research into pre-Civil War federal law 
reveal[s] two important things about the early history of federal 
regulations concerning domestic relations.  First, . . . during the pre-Civil 
War era all three branches of the federal government were actively 
engaged in creating and enforcing laws and policies that bore directly on 
families, whether it was the creation and administration of widows and 
orphans’ war pensions, the regulation of married women’s citizenship, 
or—perhaps most surprisingly—the resolution of an array of domestic 
relations issues in federal court, often pursuant to uniform federal 
standards. . . .  [F]ederal lawmakers and jurists recognized the important 
connection between republicanism (as they understood that concept) and 
domestic relations. . . .  [H]istorical sources demonstrate that national 
jurists and lawmakers played a role in the process, slow and halting as it 
was, of examining and sometimes even displacing the hierarchical 
principles that were part and parcel of the common law of domestic 
relations.67 
American legal history from the pre-Civil War era is filled with numerous 
examples of federal regulation of domestic relations issues in many areas 
over which the federal government exercises exclusive lawmaking authority 
including citizenship, federal pensions, and federal equity principles (which 
often displaced state domestic relations and inheritance laws).68  Indeed, 
some have observed that “federal actors would not shy from asserting, or 
even creating, federal citizenship [and pension] laws and regulations [and 
equity principles] that directly impacted the scope and effect of domestic 
relations law and policy.”69  Thus, the power of Congress to define and 
regulate domestic relations status, incidents, and effects for the purposes of 
federal laws and programs has long been exercised and is well established. 
 
 65. See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA:  A HISTORY 258–77 
(2000); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS:  THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992); Collins, supra note 53, at 1764–65 nn.14, 16 
& 18 (2005) (citing NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:  A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
NATION 258–77 (2000)); Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen:  Reconstruction Era 
Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999); Hasday, 
supra note 53; Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism:  Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 
111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001); Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender:  Women, 
Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1717–29 (1991); Reva B. 
Siegel, She the People:  The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 998–1003 (2002); Wardle, Who Decides?, supra note 52, at 
172–76. 
 66. Collins, supra note 53, at 1765. 
 67. Id. at 1767–68. 
 68. Id. at 1777–1843. 
 69. Id. at 1815–17. 
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III.  THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 
Part III considers DOMA, and section 3 in particular, and examines 
whether the Congressional proclamation that same-sex unions are not 
considered valid marriages for purposes of federal law—whatever their 
status under the laws of a particular state’s law—violates constitutional 
principles of federalism. 
A.  The Purpose of DOMA to Clarify Marriage Recognition Law 
DOMA, enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton in 
1996,70 was intended to provide certainty regarding the “horizontal” and 
“vertical” recognition of same-sex marriages, and for over a decade it did 
just that.  Since 2008, however, a new wave of litigation has challenged the 
constitutionality of DOMA.  The uncertainty attendant to normal litigation 
has been significantly compounded by the “about face” of the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) since 2009 which, under the Administration of President 
Obama, initially provided only the most reluctant, ineffective defense of 
DOMA,71 and ultimately announced in 2011 that it would no longer defend 
the Act.72  Ironically, the Obama Administration’s decision to take a dive in 
the DOMA litigation—perhaps intended to “pass the buck” to the judicial 
branch in hopes that if the Administration did not defend the law, the Court 
would invalidate DOMA and save the Democrats in Congress and in the 
White House from the political pain of trying to repeal the Act—seems to 
have compounded the confusion. 
In 1996, the constitutionality of DOMA was undisputed.  The votes in 
both houses of Congress in favor of enacting DOMA were overwhelming 
and bipartisan:  the House of Representatives passed DOMA by a vote of 
342 to 67,73 and the Senate approved DOMA by a vote of 85 to 14.74  
 
 70. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). 
 71. See Wardle, Section Three of DOMA, supra note 52, at 969–70; see also A Defense 
of Fairness Act, WASH. POST, July 11, 2010, at A16 (describing the Obama Justice 
Department’s defense of DOMA as “tepid”); Carrie Johnson, Obama Says Marriage Law 
Should Be Repealed, Justice Dept. Filing Distances Administration from Arguments that 
Angered Gays, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2009, at A2; Jennifer Steinhauer, House Republicans 
Step In to Defend Marriage Act and Dodge a Party Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at 
A16 (observing that “the Department of Justice was making a pretty tepid and halfhearted 
defense”). 
 72. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Att’y Gen. on Litigation Involving 
the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html.  This statement is part of the Obama Administration’s 
multifaceted effort to promote same-sex marriage in federal law. See, e.g., Matthew Pomy, 
DOJ Indicates Denying Same-Sex Couples Military Benefits Is Unconstitutional, JURIST 
(February 19, 2012, 10:33 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/02/doj-inidcates-denying-
same-sex-couples-military-benefits-is-unconstitutional.php (“This is the latest in the Obama 
Administration’s fight for marriage equality.  The ruling is likely to affect a suit . . . brought 
earlier this month over the denial of disability benefits to a same-sex spouse of a veteran.”). 
 73. See 142 CONG. REC. 17,094 (1996). 
 74. See id. at 22,467. 
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President Clinton signed DOMA without any veto threat or public criticism, 
and his DOJ opined that DOMA was constitutional.75 
DOMA was enacted to calm fears that if Hawaii (or any other state) 
legalized same-sex marriage, then some courts would force other states and 
federal agencies and programs to recognize those same-sex marriages.76   
Specifically, section 2 of the Act intended to provide federal protection 
against the growing threat that legalization of same-sex marriage in one 
state would lead to judicial rulings or executive decrees mandating that 
other states recognize same-sex marriage over objections of the people and 
lawmakers in those states.77  The drafters of section 2 of DOMA wanted to 
prevent advocates of same-sex marriage from using federal law—
particularly the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, as well as 
federal statutes and choice of law doctrines—to compel recognition of 
same-sex marriage in resistant states.78  The principal concern of DOMA’s 
drafters was to preserve the states’ authority over marriage recognition in 
the face of the pressures that were being exerted (under full faith and credit 
 
 75. Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash:  Marriage Equality Litigation, 
Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1186 (2009) (contrasting the lack of public 
backlash to judicial decisions invalidating antimiscegenation laws with strong public 
backlash to judicial decisions mandating same-sex marriage). 
 76. See generally The Defense of Marriage Act:  Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 23–42 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Senate Hearing] 
(statement of Lynn D. Wardle, Prof. of Law, Brigham Young Univ. Law Sch.); Defense of 
Marriage Act, Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 225–26 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 House Hearing] 
(statement of Jay Alan Sekulow, Chief Counsel, Am. Ctr. for Law and Justice).   
 77. See 1996 Senate Hearing, supra note 76; 1996 House Hearing, supra note 76; H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-664, at 2, 6–10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905. 
 78. Congress was informed that many advocates of same-sex marriage were arguing that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause would compel other states to recognize same-sex marriages 
performed in any state. See 1996 House Hearing, supra note 77, at 181–83 (statement of 
Lynn D. Wardle, Prof. of Law, Brigham Young Univ. Law Sch.) (citing Barbara J. Cox, 
Same Sex Marriage and Choice of Law:  If We Marry in Hawaii Are We Still Married When 
We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1041 n.23; Deborah M. Henson, Will Same Sex 
Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?  Full Faith and Credit and Due Process 
Limitations on States’ Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual 
Marriage Following Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 584 (1993–
94); Nancy Klingeman & Kenneth May, For Better or For Worse, in Sickness and in Health, 
Until Death Do Us Part:  A Look at Same-Sex Marriage in Hawaii, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 447 
(1994); Habib A. Balian, Note, Til Death Do Us Part:  Granting Full Faith & Credit to 
Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 401, 406–08 (1995)); see also 1996 Senate Hearing, 
supra note 77, at 3 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (a purpose of the bill is to “ensure that no 
one State can dictate how every other State must treat” same-sex marriages); id. at 24 
(statement of Lynn D. Wardle, Prof. of Law, Brigham Young Univ. Law Sch.) (DOMA is 
necessary to prevent the “use of Federal authority to force unwilling States to recognize 
same-sex marriage or to impose same-sex marriage on Federal law without the approval of 
Congress”); id. at 31 (“[Q]uite a number of same-sex marriage advocates have written law 
review articles asserting that if Hawaii or any other state legalizes same-sex marriage, all 
other states would be required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to 
recognize same-sex marriage.”); 1996 House Hearing, supra note 77, at 221–27 (statement 
of Jay Alan Sekulow, Chief Counsel, Am. Ctr. for Law and Justice) (citing several other 
examples of same-sex marriage advocates asserting that they will expect same-sex marriages 
done in Hawaii to be recognized in other states). 
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and choice of law arguments) to force resistant states to recognize same-sex 
marriages involuntarily.79  DOMA was intended to protect and preserve the 
historic and constitutionally reserved right of each state to decide for itself 
whether, and, if so, when and how, to recognize domestic relationships, 
including same-sex marriages.80 
The Act simply codified long settled understanding and precedents that 
allowed states to decide for themselves whether to recognize controversial 
domestic relations created in other states.81  Accordingly, section 2 of 
DOMA specifically preserved and protected state autonomy for marriage 
recognition, allowing each affected state to choose for itself whether or not 
to recognize same-sex marriages validly contracted in other states.82  It 
clarified the interstate marriage recognition issue that had been created 
when many same-sex marriage advocates had asserted, in law review 
articles and elsewhere, that if one state legalized same-sex marriage, all 
other states would be required to recognize such marriages under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause or choice of law principles. 
Section 3, likewise, was intended to preserve and protect the 
jurisdictional self-determination regarding same-sex marriage—specifically 
to preserve the authority of Congress to determine whether, and, if so, when 
and how, to recognize same-sex marriages for purposes of federal laws and 
programs.83  Just as section 2 confirmed the authority of the individual 
states to determine for themselves whether to recognize same-sex marriage, 
section 3 reaffirmed that Congress would determine for itself whether, 
when, and to what extent to recognize same-sex marriages in federal laws 
and programs. 
 
 79. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996) (“H.R. 3396 [DOMA] is a response to a very 
particular development in the State of Hawaii. . . .  [It] threatens to have very real 
consequences both on federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage laws) of the 
various states.”); id. at 6–7 (“[DOMA] is inspired . . . by the implications that [the Baehr v. 
Lewin] lawsuit threatens to have on the other States and on federal law.”); id. at 7 (“Simply 
stated, the gay rights organizations and lawyers driving the Hawaiian lawsuit have made 
plain that they consider Hawaii to be only the first step in a national effort to win by judicial 
fiat the right to same-sex ‘marriage.’  And the primary mechanism for national [same-sex 
marriage] . . . will be the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”) (citing 
Memorandum by Evan Wolfson, Director of the Marriage Project, Lambda Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, Inc., Winning and Keeping Equal Marriage Rights:  What Will Follow 
Victory in Baehr v. Lewin? 2 (Mar. 20, 1996)). 
 80. See Wardle, Who Decides?, supra note 52, at 149. 
 81. See Wardle, supra note 16 (reviewing the history of state recognition of 
controversial domestic relations from other jurisdictions and of nonrecognition when deemed 
contrary to a strong state policy).  The Williams cases are distinguishable because they 
involved interjurisdictional recognition of a judicial decree (divorce) rather than of a state 
administrative act (marriage), and there was no Congressional directive applicable in 
Williams. 
 82. See Linda J. Silberman, Rethinking Rules of Conflict of Laws in Marriage and 
Divorce in the United States:  What Can We Learn from Europe?, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1999, 
2002–03 (2008). 
 83. Wardle, Section Three of DOMA, supra note 52; Wardle, Who Decides?, supra note 
52. 
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DOMA “did not change the existing law” regarding horizontal or vertical 
recognition of domestic relationships, “but merely codified the long-
established federal choice of law rule and full faith and credit principle that 
states may choose for themselves whether to recognize” particular types, 
kinds, or forms of “marriages, validly contracted in other states.”84  While 
Congress arguably had the power to forbid the interstate recognition of 
same-sex marriage, the language of both sections “underscores the 
structural focus of the provision as well as its neutrality.”85  It only shielded 
each state and the federal government against coerced recognition of same-
sex marriages; it did not prohibit any state or Congress from voluntarily 
recognizing same-sex marriages contracted in other states. 
As Patrick Borchers, former Dean of Creighton Law School, observed, 
“Sometimes ideas gain momentum through repetition.  The idea that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause would require national recognition of a same-
sex marriage solemnized by one state is apparently one of them. . . .  
[However,] this is a very dubious assertion.”86  Similarly, Professor Emily 
Sack of Roger Williams University School of Law has noted that even 
“[o]pponents of [DOMA] . . . argued it was unnecessary because the 
Constitution itself would not require states to give the same-sex marriages 
recognition.”87  There is little serious or credible argument that section 2 of 
DOMA is unconstitutional.  The power of Congress to set standards for the 
interstate recognition of sister-state laws, records, and judgments (including 
those relating to family relations) is too clearly expressed in the 
Constitution, too long established, and too frequently used and approved to 
be brushed aside with feeble, outcome-determined arguments.88  As Yale 
Law Professor Lea Brilmayer explained when she testified before Congress: 
Although some people have expressed skepticism about whether DOMA 
is constitutional, these are mostly people whose expertise lies outside the 
area of conflict of laws.  Even most lawyers are not fully familiar with the 
history of congressional implementation of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, and they underestimate the latitude it gives to adopt legislation.  
 
 84. Wardle, Who Decides?, supra note 52, at 151. 
 85. Id. at 152. 
 86. Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 353 (2005). 
 87. Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines:  The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders, 98 NW. U. 
L. REV. 827, 889 (2004) (“[S]ome advocates and scholars on both sides of the DOMA debate 
acknowledged that due to the ‘public policy exception,’ other states with connection to the 
parties likely would not have to recognize same-sex marriages from another state.”). 
 88. See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006) (granting full faith and 
credit to child custody determinations as part of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act); 
§ 1738B (full faith and credit for child support orders); Borchers, supra note 16, at 147; 
Hogue, supra note 16, at 29; Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 465 (2005). 
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Constitutional power to enact such legislation is found in Article IV 
itself.89 
B.  DOMA, Federalism, and Alternatives to American-Style Federalism 
in Family Law 
The purpose of DOMA, particularly section 3, is to preserve and support 
federalism.90  Federalism serves many important purposes in our 
constitutional system of democratic government.  It controls, restrains, and 
prevents abuse of government power.  It promotes democracy and protects 
individual liberty.  It respects and preserves local authority and grassroots 
democracy.  It fosters diversity and protects minorities.  Indeed, the 
architecture of federalism is an integral part of our constitutional system.91 
The drafters of DOMA reasonably believed that federalism in family law 
was threatened by efforts to promote the legalization of same-sex marriage.  
They heard and feared claims that federal judges and other officials would 
interpret federal laws and programs so as to mandate the legalization and 
recognition of same-sex marriage in those federal laws and programs, and 
also in state laws and programs.  They also heard and feared claims that if 
any state legalized same-sex marriage then all other states would have to 
recognize same-sex marriages performed in that state.  Thus, they had 
concerns about both vertical and horizontal federalism and about the 
cognate power diffusion principle of separation of powers.  Consequently, 
they enacted section 2 of DOMA to clarify that federal law does not require 
any state to recognize (or not to recognize) out-of-state same-sex marriages; 
 
 89. Judicial Activism vs. Democracy:  What are the National Implications of the 
Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage 
Laws?:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Property Rights 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 70 (2004) (statement of Lea Brilmayer, Prof. 
of Law, Yale Law Sch.), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/
108hrg/96924.pdf; see also Lea Brilmayer, Full Faith and Credit, WALL ST. J., March 9, 
2004, at A16. 
 90. See Wardle, Section Three of DOMA, supra note 52, at 974–76. 
 91. See Jonathan H. Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 89 (2012) (“Federalism is an essential part of the Constitution’s 
design.  The division of sovereign power between the States and the federal government 
helps foster interjurisdictional competition, which, in turn, checks government power.”); 
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 428 (1998) (“Under existing doctrine, federalism acts largely as a side 
constraint on legislation of national scope.  In contrast, in democratic experimentalism, 
federalism is an essential ingredient of the national framework.”); Edward A. Fallone, 
Charters, Compacts, and Tea Parties:  The Decline and Resurrection of a Delegation View 
of the Constitution, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1067, 1074 (2010) (“[A] general distrust of 
centralized power is an integral part of the constitutional design. . . .  [T]his recognition 
elevates the principles of federalism and separation of powers to the level of basic 
constitutional commands, even though these principles are not explicitly referenced by the 
text of the Constitution.”); John F. Manning, Essay, Clear Statement Rules and the 
Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 403 (2010) (noting that there are some 
“‘underenforced constitutional norms’—principles such as the separation of powers and 
federalism, which are integral to the constitutional scheme but whose details often cannot be 
convincingly articulated at the level of individual cases”). 
 2012] INVOLUNTARY IMPORTS 793 
that is up to the states to decide for themselves, and section 3 was enacted 
to clarify that federal law does not recognize same-sex marriages (at least 
until Congress itself chooses to change that law).  They protected and 
reinforced the states’ and Congress’s respective rights to decide the 
interjurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriage issue, confirming that 
such a controversial issue should be decided by those with the proper 
authority within the jurisdiction most directly affected by the issue. 
The most commonly discussed federalism concern regarding family law 
is preserving state primacy of control over the direct regulation of domestic 
relations.  The federal regulation of domestic relations has mushroomed in 
recent decades as part of the ongoing shift of government powers from the 
states to the federal government.92  As University of Virginia Law 
Professor Kenneth R. Redden wrote nearly thirty years ago, “For two 
centuries American lawyers could safely rely on state law alone in their 
advice to clients on a domestic relations matter.  This is no longer possible 
since a vast new body of federal law (judicial, legislative and 
administrative) has just been created in the last two decades.”93  Much 
recent discussion of federalism occurs as a reaction to this development. 
However, the federalism issue concerning section 3 of DOMA is unique 
in two respects.  Rather than respecting the authority of each jurisdiction to 
regulate domestic relations in its own sphere (e.g., Massachusetts in 
Massachusetts law, Utah in Utah law, the federal government in federal 
law), opponents of DOMA seek to impose the law of one jurisdiction upon 
another jurisdiction (e.g., imposing the law of Massachusetts on the federal 
government’s agencies and programs).  And rather than top down 
jurisdiction, such as where the federal government imposes its laws upon 
the citizens of the various states, it is upside down, in that a minority of 
states are seeking to impose their controversial redefinition of marriage 
upon the federal government (and sister states).  This is violative  of the 
sovereign spheres of separate governments. 
It is ironic that opponents of section 3 of DOMA now are arguing that 
federalism is weakened or impaired by DOMA.  Their goal is to pressure, 
coerce, and force the states into legalizing same-sex marriage by the use of 
federal power.  They intend to have “marriage” defined to include same-sex 
unions for purposes of federal programs that are administered in the states.  
Because such federal programs are intertwined with and integral to state 
law and programs, the legalization of same-sex marriage for purposes of 
federal programs will create major administrative problems for the states 
(the problems complained of by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in its 
 
 92. See generally Collins, supra note 53; Linda Henry Elrod, The Federalization of 
Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 103 (1990); Ann Laquer 
Estin, Sharing Governance:  Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 267 (2009); Hasday, supra note 53; Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175 (2000); Robert G. Spector, The Nationalization of Family Law:  
Introduction to the Manual for the Coming Age, 27 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1993). 
 93. KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF FAMILY LAW v (1982). 
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challenge to DOMA).94  Consequently, such administrative burdens may 
pressure some states into legalizing same-sex marriage. American 
federalism is designed to prevent precisely this power dynamic, wherein the 
national government exercises its heavy-handed influence upon the states. 
However, federalism is two-edged.  So long as states and the federal 
government can adopt different definitions of marriage for purposes of their 
respective laws and programs, some disparity and conflict is inevitable.95 
Currently, the burden of this discrepancy falls upon the small minority of 
states that have legalized same-sex marriage, who are now trying to force 
the national government to recognize or adopt their definitions of marriage 
for the purposes of federal programs.  The attempt of these states to gain 
federal recognition of same-sex marriage occurs, at least in part, because 
the present difference in standards and definitions of marriage creates 
administrative problems for these states, which provides an incentive for 
those states to abandon same-sex marriage and for other states not to 
recognize same-sex marriage.  On the other hand, if they succeed and the 
federal government recognizes same-sex marriages, the administrative 
burdens of disharmony between state marriage law and federal marriage 
law (which, as noted, is the core complaint of the plaintiffs in the suits 
against DOMA) could switch and be thrust upon the majority of states that 
have declined to recognize same-sex marriage, providing an incentive for 
them to adopt same-sex marriage for purposes of administrative 
convenience in interacting with federal programs. 
Federalism is the source of the problem from either perspective.96  
Today, about two-dozen nations in the world employ some form of 
federalism,97 but they differ widely in form, structure and substance.98  So 
 
 94. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239–
44 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (describing problems imposed on the 
state by discrepant federal-state programs for veterans and medical assistance). 
 95. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Carlton M. Smith & Edward 
Stein, Dealing with DOMA:  Federal Non-Recognition Complicates State Income Taxation 
of Same-Sex Relationships, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2012).  For further 
information, see Wardle, supra note 15, at 222–49 (discussing the history and purpose of 
federalism in family law). 
 96. “Federalism is a form of government in which sovereign powers are constitutionally 
divided between a central government and geographically defined, semi-autonomous levels 
of government.” Keith S. Rossen, Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 
26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994).  “[T]he essential characteristics of federalism 
can be reduced to two:  (1) constitutional division of powers between the central and 
regional levels of government, and (2) entrenched regional representation in the central 
government.” Id. 
 97. Federalism by Country, FORUM FEDERATIONS, http://www.forumfed.org/en/
federalism/by_country/index.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (listing twenty-four nations as 
having federalist forms of government and two other nations that are transitioning to 
federalism). 
 98. John Kincaid, Comparative Observations, FORUM FEDERATIONS 11 (2005), available 
at http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/Global_Dialogue/Book_1/BK1-C13-co-Kincaid-en.pdf.  
For instance, some federal governments are very centralized, while others (like India, Russia, 
and Nigeria) allow for concurrent regulation by the national and state or provincial 
governments of specific subjects, including family law. Id. 
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the real question is whether the American style of federalism—especially 
federalism in family law—should be preserved or replaced with a more 
robust form of nationalism in family law or a more robust form of states’ 
rights in family law.  The three principal options in terms of power 
allocation in a federal system are:  (1) to become more national; that is, to 
have all (or mostly all) domestic relations regulated by Congress and the 
federal government, such that states become more like mere administrative 
subdivisions of the unitary national government, forcing states to conform 
to and implement federal definitions and regulations of domestic relations 
in state laws;99 (2) to recognize a stronger version of state sovereignty and 
total state supremacy in family law whereby the national government must 
always adopt, recognize, and apply state definitions and regulations of 
family law in federal laws;100 or (3) to preserve the historic uneasy balance 
of American federalism in which states have plenary authority to define and 
regulate domestic relations for purposes of state law (family law), while the 
national government has plenary (sometimes conflicting) authority to define 
and regulate domestic relations for purposes of federal laws and programs 
(e.g., federal immigration, military benefits, social security),101 which has 
the constant potential for some conflict and inconsistency between how 
family is defined by the national government for purposes of federal law 
and how it is defined locally for purposes of state family law. 
There are some advantages and disadvantages to each approach.102  The 
most popular form of national federalism in the world today is Option 
(1),103 but Option (2) is a conceptual possibility, and some argue that the 
 
 99. This can be called “centralized federalism.” 
 100. This can be called “diffused federalism,” and opponents of section 3 of DOMA 
articulate a version of it. See generally Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1787 (1995); Hasday, supra note 53. 
 101. This can be called “balanced federalism.” See generally Estin, supra note 92; Jill 
Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825 (2004) (state and federal 
authorities both exist in the “family law canon”). 
 102. See generally Abe R. Gluck, Essay, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory 
Interpretation:  State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 
YALE L.J. 534 (2011) (focusing on federalism in statutory interpretation, and offering a very 
thorough and elucidating review of many federalism theories and approaches—including my 
favorite, “entrenchment through polycentricity”).  Others, including 
[William] Eskridge and [John] Ferejohn, for example, emphasize the importance 
of dialogic deliberation in statutory interpretation and implementation, a process 
they believe must be ‘complicated, polycentric, experimental, forward-looking, 
[and] problem-solving’ to succeed.  They and other scholars have argued that 
federal agencies are the central players in this story, surrounded by a supporting 
cast of partners in Congress and the federal judiciary who engage them in dialogue 
along the way. 
Id. at 568–69 (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES:  THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 21 (2010)). 
 103. For example, in Canada the federal government regulates substance and the 
provinces regulate form. See Rossen, supra note 96, at 11–12 (noting that the Canadian 
Constitution, designed “to correct what they deemed a major flaw in U.S. Federalism, the 
weakness of the federal government,” gives the Canadian national government “the power to 
regulate areas traditionally regarded as reserved to the U.S. states, such as criminal law, 
marriage and divorce”).  For Switzerland, see Barbara Graham-Sietenthaler, International 
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relative power of the states is increasing and should grow in some discrete 
areas of the law.104  However, both of these alternatives sacrifice the unique 
style of balanced American federalism (Option 3) that has worked well to 
preserve a balance of power between the national and state governments for 
over two centuries, and to prevent the overconcentration of power in one 
branch or level of government that was a core concern and major 
achievement of the drafters of our Constitution.105 
The Supreme Court has declared, “[O]ur federalism is not Europe’s.  It is 
‘the unique contribution of the Framers to political science and political 
theory.’”106  Justice Kennedy expressed it well when he noted that 
[American] Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery.  The Framers 
split the atom of sovereignty.  It was the genius of their idea that our 
citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, 
each protected from incursion by the other.  The resulting Constitution 
created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two 
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own 
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who 
sustain it and are governed by it.107 
Thus, “[w]e live under a unique concept of federalism and divided 
sovereignty between the nation and fifty States.”108  Whether America’s 
unique style of federalism in family law will endure is a core conceptual 
constitutional question that is at issue, albeit concealed, in litigation over 
section 3 of DOMA. 
 
Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition, 29 FAM. L.Q. 685, 685–86 (1995) 
(marriage law is regulated by the Swiss Civil Code).  For Australia, see AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTION S 51 (Parliament has power to make laws concerning marriage).  For Brazil, 
see CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 226 (Braz.) (the Brazilian 
Constitution gives protection to the institution of marriage).  For Germany, see 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I 
[BGBL. I] 255–63, as amended, §§ 1297–1362, available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/german_civil_code.pdf (marriage law is regulated by the German 
Civil Code). 
 104. See generally Scott Obernberger, When Love and Abuse Are Not Mutually Exclusive:  
The Need for Government Intervention, 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 355 (1997) (noting increased 
state intervention into family life under broadly-drafted state statutes); Rick Su, A Localist 
Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1622–24 (2008) (noting 
the increase in state regulation of immigration); Peter Micek, Comment, A Genealogy of 
Home Visits:  Explaining the Relentless Search for Individualized Information Without 
Individual Suspicion, 44 U.S.F L. REV. 1007, 1015 (2010) (states have growing power over 
certain welfare issues). 
 105. See Wardle, supra note 15, at 224–34. 
 106. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (quoting United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 107. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 108. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 704 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983)). 
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IV.  EFFORTS TO LEGISLATIVELY REPEAL OR 
JUDICIALLY INVALIDATE DOMA 
Part IV provides an overview of Congressional efforts to repeal DOMA 
and litigation efforts to have DOMA declared unconstitutional.  It begins by 
noting some significant errors in the First Circuit’s opinion in 
Massachusetts. Next, it explains why certain states justifiably insist that 
marriage is exclusively the union of a man and a woman, and does not 
include the union of two persons of the same gender.  In so doing, it asserts 
that the “thick” historical understanding of marriage deserves and requires 
special protection and exclusive recognition in our law, and that the “thin” 
conception of marriage, that seems to be increasingly popular in some 
quarters of American culture today is wholly inadequate to meet the needs 
of American families and society.  Finally, it discusses how the federal 
legalization of same-sex marriage and the resulting forced recognition of 
same-sex marriages by the states would violate core principles of 
federalism. 
A.  Legislative Politics:  Efforts to Repeal DOMA in Congress 
Opponents of DOMA have expended great political effort to repeal the 
Act.109  However, their efforts have not gotten any significant traction to 
date.  It is clear that DOMA’s detractors have never had the votes to repeal 
DOMA, and presently do not have the votes, even in the Democrat 
controlled Senate.  It seems unlikely, therefore, that Congress will repeal 
DOMA in the near future.  The Democrats, who currently generally favor 
repeal of DOMA, have controlled the executive branch under President 
Obama for nearly four years, have controlled the Senate for the same four 
years, and simultaneously controlled both houses of Congress for two of 
those years.  Yet, they have not even brought a bill to repeal DOMA to the 
floor for a vote in the Senate,110 and the repeal bill in the House is idle in a 
subcommittee.111  Accordingly, most political observers report that 
Congress is unlikely to repeal DOMA in the foreseeable future.112 
 
 109. See Wardle, Section Three of DOMA, supra note 52, at 960–64. 
 110. The DOMA repeal bill in the Senate was passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
and has been placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar. See Bill Summary and Status, 112th 
Congress (2011–2012), S.598, LIBR. CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?
d112:SN00598: (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 111. Bill Summary and Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012), H.R.1116, LIBR. CONG., 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.1116: (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  The 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee is responsible for the 
DOMA repeal bill in the House of Representatives. 
 112. See Jessica Brady, Democrats Eyeing DOMA Repeal, ROLL CALL (Oct. 19, 2011, 
12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_44/Democrats-Eyeing-DOMA-Repeal-
209583-1.html (contrasting the unlikely DOMA repeal with the more bipartisan and strategic 
effort to repeal “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” and noting that Senator Feinstein has admitted that 
the repeal does not have the votes for passage, even in the Senate); see also Constance 
Gilchrest, Cobra Legislative Review Foreshadows its Future, MANDATED HEALTH 
BENEFITS—THE COBRA GUIDE, Sept. 2011, at 1, 7, available at http://service
bureaus.infinisource.com/Infinisource/Benefit_Resources/Published-Articles/Thompson%
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That said, the opponents of DOMA who are working to repeal the law 
through the legislative process deserve to be commended for their attempt 
to reform or repeal the law in the right way—the way it was enacted—by 
legislation.  DOMA was created by Congress, and, if it is to be changed, it 
is Congress’s responsibility and prerogative to decide if, when, and how.  
Since Congress is accountable to the voters, the apparent reluctance of 
Congress to repeal DOMA suggests something about voter and popular 
sentiment in America regarding recognition of same-sex marriages from 
other jurisdictions. 
B.  Efforts to Invalidate DOMA in the Courts 
Chances for DOMA to be judicially overturned are greater.  Before 2009 
(when the Obama administration took over the defense of DOMA), the DOJ 
had successfully defended DOMA for thirteen years.  No court had 
invalidated DOMA, and it had been upheld as constitutional in at least five 
federal court decisions in four different federal court cases challenging 
section 3 of the Act.113  In the three and a half years since the Obama 
administration took over the defense of DOMA and ceased defending it 
competently, at least five federal courts have ruled that section 3 of DOMA 
is unconstitutional.114 
 
2011-09%20(Connie-COBRA%20Legislative%20Review).pdf (“The chances of the . . . 
DOMA-repeal bills passing on their own are unlikely.”); Carolyn Lochhead, Feinstein’s Bill 
to Repeal DOMA Clears Committee, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.sf
gate.com/politics/article/Feinstein-s-bill-to-repeal-DOMA-clears-committee-2323680.php 
(acknowledging that, despite getting out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill to repeal 
DOMA “stands little chance of overcoming opposition from Republicans,” not to mention 
the likely opposition of Democrats in conservative-leaning states); Humberto Sanchez, 
DOMA Repeal Might Fail, but Backers Cite its Progress, ROLL CALL (Nov. 1, 2011, 12:00 
AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_51/Defense_of_Marriage_Act_Repeal_Vote_Set-
209905-1.html. 
 113. See Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of 
section 2 claim and remanding to dismiss section 3 claim on the merits); Wilson v. Ake, 354 
F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004); 
see also Smelt v. United States, No. SACV 09-00286 Doc (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/19079566/Order-Dismissing-Smelt-v-
United-States-of-America (Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss). But see In re 
Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2009) (administrative decision holding that DOMA was 
improper). 
 114. See Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (holding DOMA unconstitutional); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 
397 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (DOMA violates federalism and Equal 
Protection); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 
249, 253 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment by 
improperly infringing state authority to regulate marital status as a sovereign attribute of 
statehood), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (DOMA violates federalism and Equal 
Protection); In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 579 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that DOMA 
violates the Equal Protection rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); 
see also Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. C10-01564, 2012 WL 1909603, at *13 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
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Sadly, the recent judicial opinions invalidating DOMA fall below the 
usual standard of quality of the federal courts in terms of legal writing and 
analysis.115  They are notably deficient in their historical, precedential and 
doctrinal thoroughness, as well as their accuracy and legal reasoning.  In 
fairness to the courts, it must be noted that the DOJ provided only an 
ineffective and politically hamstrung defense of the Act,116 ultimately 
refused to defend the law altogether,117 and even has conceded that DOMA 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.118  Therefore, the substandard quality 
of the resulting judicial opinions may well be due in no small part to the 
current DOJ’s inadequate defense of DOMA, as federal courts generally 
rely upon the lawyers’ briefs and memoranda in reaching and writing their 
opinions. 
C.  The First Circuit’s Deficient Opinion in Massachusetts v. 
Department of Health and Human Services 
The non-defense of DOMA by the DOJ, however, does not totally 
explain or excuse the frustratingly deficient quality of judicial 
craftsmanship in the opinions holding that DOMA is unconstitutional.  
Indeed, as if to say that the Obama administration’s abandonment of the 
defense of DOMA did not matter, the First Circuit in Massachusetts relied 
on its own independent exercise of judicial notice as the basis for its 
description of the “legislative purpose and ‘legislative facts’ bearing upon 
the rationality” of the Act.119  Sadly, the court’s description of those 
legislative aims and facts does the court no credit.  Although the court’s 
opinion, affirming two lower court decisions holding that DOMA is 
unconstitutional under principles of equal protection and federalism, is 
readable and is judicially moderate in tone, it is less than moderate or 
credible in substance.  As outlined below, the First Circuit’s opinion is 
marred by inaccurate findings, unsupported holdings, unreliable statements, 
and a refusal to acknowledge or engage the critical arguments and evidence. 
(1)  For example, the opinion summarizes section 2 of DOMA by 
declaring that it “absolves states from recognizing same-sex marriages 
 
 115. For a critique of the defects of the First Circuit decision, see infra Part IV.C.  For 
criticism of the two federal district court opinions in Massachusetts and Gill see Wardle, 
Section Three, supra note 51, at 967–73. 
 116. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 118. After filing a brief defending DOMA, the DOJ “filed a revised brief arguing that the 
equal protection claims should be assessed under a ‘heightened scrutiny’ standard and that 
DOMA failed under that standard.” Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 
682 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Chris Johnson, Justice Dept. Brief Against DOMA 
Lauded as “Watershed Moment,” WASH. BLADE (July 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonblade
.com/2011/07/06/justice-dept-brief-against-doma-lauded-as-watershed-moment/ (noting that 
the DOJ’s brief argued that DOMA should be subject to heightened scrutiny and should be 
held unconstitutional because, in the view of the DOJ, LGBT people are a suspect class and 
DOMA was enacted out of animus toward LGBT individuals). 
 119. Id. at 7. 
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solemnized in other states.”120  That is simply not true.  To “absolve” 
means “to set free from an obligation.”121  The statement therefore assumes 
that without DOMA states are obliged to recognize same-sex marriages, a 
patently false description of the existing legal obligations under both 
conflict of laws and constitutional (Full Faith and Credit Clause) law.122  
Moreover, section 2 of DOMA declares only that states shall not be 
required (forced) to recognize same-sex marriages from other states.123 
(2) Typical of judicial decisions that impose recognition of same-sex 
marriage, the First Circuit takes liberties with the data.  For instance, it 
concludes that “[t]he number of couples thus affected [by the refusal to 
recognize same-sex marriages in federal law] is estimated at more than 
100,000.”124  However, as noted in Part I.D of this Article, while over 
130,000 American same-sex couples self-reported as married on the 2010 
Census, the Williams Institute data shows that the majority of such couples 
(perhaps close to 100,000) apparently entered into such marriages outside 
of their own state of domicile.125  The validity of such “evasive” same-sex 
marriages (and of any claim they might make to federal benefits based upon 
them) is extremely dubious under current state law and the well-established 
choice of law public policy exception applicable to marriage recognition.126  
While nearly 33,000 same-sex couples with strong claims to marriage 
validity is enough to make the point, somehow the court, disappointingly, 
could not refrain from overstating the data.  Alternatively, there is an even 
more disturbing and extreme possible implication of the court’s use of the 
inflated “more than 100,000” figure:  it might be read to suggest that even 
 
 120. Id. at 6. 
 121. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 5 (11th ed. 2004). 
 122.  See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 86, at 357; L. Lynn Hogue, Examining a Strand of 
the Public Policy Exception with Constitutional Underpinnings:  How the “Foreign 
Marriage Recognition Exception” Affects the Interjurisdictional Recognition of Same-Sex 
“Marriage,” 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 449, 450–53 (2005); Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense 
of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional:  Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the 
Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
915, 953–57 (2006); Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World?  A 
Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191, 202 
(1996); Whitten, supra note 88, at 479–83. 
 123. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (“No State, territory, or possession of the 
United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or 
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”). 
 124. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 6 (citing Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census 
Bureau Releases Estimates of Same-Sex Married Couples (Sept. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn181.html). 
 125. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 126. See, e.g., Richard S. Myers, The Public Policy Doctrine and Interjurisdictional 
Recognition of Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 531 (2005); 
Hogue, supra note 122; Wardle, supra note 16. But see Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998); Kramer, supra 
note 10. 
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invalid, evasive same-sex marriages must be deemed valid marriages for 
purposes of federal law—assuming the absence or invalidation of DOMA. 
(3) The court stated that DOMA “passed with minimal hearings and 
lacking in formal findings.”127  However, the full Judiciary Committee of 
the U.S. Senate held a hearing on the bill, as did the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of 
Representatives; together both hearings produced over 300 pages of 
testimony and congressional commentary.128  Additionally, the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives produced a formal report 
providing, among other things, a statement of the purposes of the bill, the 
background and need for the legislation, committee considerations, and 
dissenting views.129  The published Congressional committee records thus 
exceed 365 pages, not counting the vigorous debate on the bill in both 
houses of Congress recorded in the Congressional Record.130  The 
adjectives “minimal” and “lacking” seem to more appropriately characterize 
the First Circuit’s legal research than the congressional hearings and 
deliberation. 
(4) Moreover, the court rather dismissively and summarily limited the 
precedential impact of Baker v. Nelson,131 in which the Supreme Court 
summarily dismissed for want of a substantial federal question 
constitutional claims to force Minnesota to recognize same-sex marriage.132   
The First Circuit correctly noted that “Baker is precedent binding on us 
unless repudiated by subsequent Supreme Court precedent,” and the 
Supreme Court’s summary dismissal “prevent[s] lower courts from coming 
to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily 
decided” in such a case.133  So far, so good.  Then the First Circuit ended its 
discussion of Baker, concluding, “Baker does not resolve our own case but 
it does limit the arguments to ones that do not presume or rest on a 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage.”134  This concluding declaration, 
unfortunately, is only half of the truth. 
In the Minnesota courts, the plaintiffs in Baker relied on the same 
constitutional doctrines as in the First Circuit’s Massachusetts decision—
both due process (claiming a “right” to same-sex marriage) and equal 
protection (arguing that the refusal to legalize same-sex marriage violated 
equality), and the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly ruled on and rejected 
both claims.135  The same-sex couple in Baker then appealed to the 
 
 127. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8. 
 128. 1996 Senate Hearing, supra note 77, at 1–78. 
 129. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 1–45 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905. 
 130. 1996 Senate Hearing, supra note 77 (82 pages); 1996 House Hearing, supra note 77, 
at 3 (247 pages); H.R. REP. NO. 104-664 (45 pages). 
 131. 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Baker, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186–87 (Minn. 1971). 
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Supreme Court.  Their jurisdictional statement raised three constitutional 
issues: 
1. Whether [the state]’s refusal to sanctify appellants’ marriage deprives 
appellants of their liberty to marry and of their property without due 
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. Whether [the state]’s refusal, pursuant to [its] marriage statutes, to 
sanctify appellants’ marriage because both are of the male sex violates 
their rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
3. Whether [the state]’s refusal to sanctify appellants’ marriage deprives 
appellants of their right to privacy under the Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.136 
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court’s dismissal of the appeal in Baker 
for want of a substantial federal question held that a jurisdiction’s refusal to 
give marital status to same-sex couples did not violate either the Due 
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.  Yet the First Circuit in 
Massachusetts struck down DOMA as a violation of Equal Protection for 
refusing to recognize same-sex marriage for purposes of federal law.137 
And it did so without any analysis of or attempt to distinguish the equal 
protection analysis in Baker. 
(5) While purporting to reject “heightened scrutiny” the court “require[d] 
a closer than usual review.”138  The accepted legal term for “closer than 
usual review” is “heightened scrutiny.”  Calling heightened scrutiny by 
another name (e.g., “closer than usual review”) does not change the nature 
(or smell) of it.  The court conceded that “[u]nder [the traditional] rational 
basis standard, the Gill plaintiffs cannot prevail.”139  Yet under its 
anonymous and unidentified, elevated standard of scrutiny, the First Circuit 
held that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.140   
Courts seriously transgress the separation of powers and popular 
sovereignty when they create new suspect classifications, invent new 
fundamental rights, or otherwise apply elevated scrutiny (under any label) 
in the absence of some clear constitutional text or constitutional consensus 
in the nation that strongly supports the preferential treatment of the claimed 
right or classification.  The fact that voters in thirty-two states have rejected 
same-sex marriage—thirty-one by adopting constitutional amendments 
banning same-sex marriage—shows the absence of the necessary 
constitutional consensus in the body of the sovereign people to require legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage.  This also distinguishes the case from 
Lawrence v. Texas141 and Romer v. Evans,142 in which widespread state 
 
 136. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants at 3, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) 
(No. 71-1027). 
 137. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 16. 
 138. Id. at 8. 
 139. Id. at 9. 
 140. Id. at 11–16. 
 141. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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decriminalization of sodomy laws and the ubiquitous non-denial to gays 
and lesbians of usual civic and public privileges made the characterization 
of the Texas anti-sodomy law and the discriminatory Colorado provision 
glaringly isolated, marginal, and out of the mainstream of the American 
social consensus. 
(6) The court justified its enhanced scrutiny because of the “discrepant 
impact among married couples.”143  That is an oblique way of saying that it 
applied stricter scrutiny because the law draws a marriage distinction based 
on the classification of same-sex couples.  While courts are certainly free to 
take the path less traveled, applying “closer than usual review” to same-sex 
marriage certainly qualifies as breaking with the precedents and leaving the 
beaten path.  While two feeble state court efficacious rulings have held that 
classification based on same-sex unions requires heightened scrutiny,144 as 
did one unreliable federal district court opinion of a potentially biased 
federal trial court judge in California (affirmed, nonetheless by the Ninth 
Circuit),145 nearly all federal appellate courts have rejected the claim that 
enhanced or strict scrutiny should apply to legal distinctions based upon 
sexual orientation.  As Dale Carpenter wrote in 2008: 
Despite the academic consensus, and aside from some notable exceptions, 
like a vacated Ninth Circuit opinion more than a decade ago and a dissent 
from denial of certiorari by Justice Brennan in a case from the mid-1980s, 
federal and state judges have uniformly rejected heightened scrutiny for 
sexual orientation discrimination under equal protection principles.146 
 
 142. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 143. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8. 
 144. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).  These opinions were based on false and erroneous 
fundamental premises, including a “thin” description of what marriage is, and assumed that 
(1) the answer to the question about a right to same-sex marriage and that the desired 
benefits of marriage for couples and society accompany the legal label; (2) the lack of a 
nexus between the “thick” concept of marriage and child well-being; (3) the lack of harm to 
dual-gender marriage from legalizing same-sex marriage; and (4) the absence of negative 
impact upon religious liberties from legalizing same-sex marriage. See Monte Neil Stewart, 
Jacob D. Briggs & Julie Slater, Marriage, Fundamental Premises, and the California, 
Connecticut, and Iowa Supreme Courts, 2012 BYU L. REV. 193, 274–78. 
 145. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, Perry v. 
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012); John Schwartz, Conservative Jurist, With 
Independent Streak, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at A10 (“Critics have argued that his sexual 
orientation was a source of bias . . . .”); John C. Eastman, Judge Walker Confirms Facts That 
Warrant Vacating Prop. 8 Ruling, SFGATE (Apr. 11, 2011, 4:49 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/
opinionshop/2011/04/11/judge-walker-confirms-facts-that-warrant-vacating-prop-8-ruling/ 
(“Not his sexual orientation, which alone would not require recusal, but the possibility that 
he could directly benefit from his ruling, raised the prospect that recusal may have been 
warranted.  If the relationship was such that it gave Walker a financial or other interest in the 
outcome of the proceeding . . . recusal would be mandatory and non-waivable.”).  The 
succeeding Chief Judge of the District Court denied a motion to vacate the judgment based 
on Judge Walker’s alleged bias. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011) (Order Denying Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion to Vacate Judgment). 
 146. Dale Carpenter, Sexual Orientation and Heightened Scrutiny in the California 
Marriage Decision, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 22, 2008, 11:02 AM), http://www.volokh
.com/posts/1211468552.shtml.  For further discussion of the standard of scrutiny applied to 
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As UCLA Law Professor Adam Winkler more recently noted, “Twice the 
Supreme Court has been asked to hold that discrimination against gay 
people warrants heightened scrutiny.  And twice the Supreme Court has 
rejected that argument.”147 
(7) The court relied on three Supreme Court cases, United States 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,148 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center,149 and Romer v. Evans,150 that applied “intensified scrutiny” 
“[w]ithout relying on suspect classification[].”151  However, none of those 
cases required redefining marriage or any other preexisting social institution 
like marriage.  All three cases are distinguishable because they all involved 
exclusions from existing government programs based on qualities unrelated 
to the purposes of the programs from which the individuals were excluded.  
Preserving the institution of marriage for dual-gender couples goes to the 
heart of what the legal recognition of marriage is all about.  Legal marriage 
reinforces and protects the profound social benefits that flow from the 
stable, voluntary, gender complementary, long term unions of an unrelated 
man and woman in marriage. 
(8) The court emphasized that in all three cases, the Supreme Court had 
“stressed the historic patterns of disadvantage suffered by the group 
adversely affected by the statute.”152  That statement takes some generous 
interpretative liberties with the “stressed the historic patterns” factor.  For 
example, in Moreno the majority held that the “unrelated person” provision 
of the Food Stamp Act was both underinclusive and overinclusive in that it 
did not further the government purposes of preventing fraud or avoiding the 
subsidization of “hippie communes,”153 but it did exclude those in need of 
the Food Stamp Act assistance (i.e., those the Act intended to assist) but 
who could not afford to change their economical shared living arrangements 
to become eligible.154  Thus, contrary to what the First Circuit declared, the 
Supreme Court in Moreno did not, in any significant or discernible way, 
 
same-sex marriage, see Jennie Croyle, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Proposition 8, and the 
Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 425, 430 (2011); 
William N. Eskridge Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened Equal 
Protection Scrutiny, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 2 (2010) (“The better argument [against same-sex 
marriage] is that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification . . . .”); Nan D. Hunter, 
Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1529–
30 (2004) (arguing that heightened scrutiny will involve greater intrusion into the privacy of 
gays and lesbians). 
 147. Adam Winkler, Why Obama Is Wrong on DOMA, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2011, 
12:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/why-obama-is-wrong-on-dom_b
_827676.html. 
 148. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 149. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 150. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 151. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 
2012) 
 152. Id. at 11. 
 153. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 537 (1973). 
 154. Id. at 538. 
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“stress[] the historic patterns of disadvantage suffered by the group 
adversely affected.”155 
(9) The court played the rhetorical “penalty” card.  DOMA’s refusal to 
recognize same-sex marriages in federal law, wrote the court, “will penalize 
those couples by limiting tax and social security benefits to opposite-sex 
couples.”156  However, ineligibility for positive benefits and privileges 
conferred by federal law on valid dual-gender marriages, does not “punish” 
or “penalize” anyone.  Those not eligible lose nothing they have or 
previously had.  The lack of eligibility for entitlements is not a punishment 
or penalty.  It is discrimination to be sure, but it cannot be fairly and 
honestly characterized as a penalty, since the ineligibility to receive a 
benefit or the denial of eligibility to qualify for a benefit, has no punitive or 
penal characteristics. 
(10) The court begins its federalism analysis by declaring that “DOMA 
intrudes extensively into a realm that has from the start of the nation been 
primarily confided to state regulation.”157  The last part of this statement 
correctly notes that under the general allocation of powers between the 
federal and state government, the regulation of domestic relations is 
constitutionally within the prescriptive jurisdiction of the states.  However, 
the conclusory declaration that by declining to allow states to force federal 
government programs to treat same-sex marriages the same way that they 
treat dual-gender marriages DOMA “intrudes extensively” upon the state’s 
“realm” of regulatory authority to directly regulate “the domestic relations 
of husband and wife” at best raises the ultimate question, and, is simply 
inaccurate.158  DOMA does not require (or forbid) any state to prohibit or to 
not recognize same-sex marriages.  It does not dictate or intrude upon 
whether or how the states treat same-sex marriages for purposes of “the 
whole subject of domestic relations” that is under their regulatory 
authority.159  Thus, marital status, and state-afforded incidents of marital 
status (such as benefits and privileges of state domestic relations law), 
obligations, and state law rights and duties of such status (e.g., support of 
and from spouses, co-ownership of property, interests upon divorce in 
marital or community property) are entirely unaffected by DOMA.  It is 
much more accurate to state that section 3 of DOMA forbids the states from 
“intrud[ing] extensively into a realm that has from the start of the nation 
been primarily confided to [federal] regulation”—namely the determination 
of what persons are eligible for federal welfare, pension, tax, immigration 
and other federal benefits.160 
(11) The court tries to separate DOMA from the history of federal 
regulation of marriage by stating that “no precedent exists for DOMA’s 
 
 155. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 11. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 12. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. The substitution of “federal” here is meant to invert the court’s argument. 
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sweeping general ‘federal’ definition of marriage for all federal statutes and 
programs.”161  This is both historically inaccurate and misleading.  Even the 
Supreme Court has contributed generously to a long settled, “sweeping 
general ‘federal’ definition of marriage,” as dual-gendered on multiple 
occasions.162  The Court discussed the “right to marry” in over sixty 
decisions in the first two centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence.163  
Specifically, the Court has observed that marriage was “everywhere 
regarded as a civil contract”;164 that it was “within the legitimate scope of 
the power of every civil government to determine” what form of marriage 
will be allowed within the jurisdiction of its regulatory authority;165 that 
“necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth” are 
laws that protect “the family, as consisting in and springing from the union 
for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony”;166 that 
polygamy is proscribed in all enlightened nations because it tends “to 
destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, 
to degrade woman, and debase man”;167 that legislative regulation of 
marriage is important because marriage creates “the most important relation 
in life, [and has] more to do with the morals and civilization of a people 
than any other institution”;168 that history and tradition are significant 
sources of determining legitimate definitions and regulations of 
marriage;169 that the right to marry is among the “liberties” protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it is one of the “privileges long recognized 
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men”;170 that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race”;171 and that 
[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It is an association 
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an 
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in [the Court’s] prior 
[fundamental liberty] decisions.172 
 Furthermore, the Court has held that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious 
racial discriminations.  Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not 
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 169. See Wardle, supra note 163, at 297. 
 170. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 171. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 172. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
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marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be 
infringed by the State.”173  These quotes, taken from Supreme Court 
decisions over the past 150 years, are only the tip of the iceberg of 
“sweeping and broad” general definitions and descriptions of marriage 
assuming or explicitly stating that it is dual-gendered.  It is too late in the 
day to say that there has not been broad, sweeping, or even constitutional 
definitions of marriage (including the gender integration element174) in 
federal law throughout our nation’s history. 
(12) Moreover, an uncodified but long established legal tradition that 
only dual-gender marriages were recognized as marriages in federal (and 
state) law is the context for over two centuries of federal law regulating the 
meaning and kinds of marriage that are eligible for federal programs and 
benefits.175  The record of federal judicial regulation is just the “tail” of the 
large federal “dog” of the broad and sweeping legislative and executive 
regulation of marriage, including the strong tradition of exclusive 
recognition of dual-gender marriages, for purposes of all federal programs 
and laws.176  Congressional regulation of family relations for purposes of 
federal law is beyond dispute.  In fact, the very next section after 1 U.S.C. 
§ 7 (section 3 of DOMA, the provision at issue in Massachusetts), provides 
that 
[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the words “person”, “human being”, 
“child”, and “individual”, shall include every infant member of the 
species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development.177 
“Child” is a domestic relationship status normally regulated by state law.  
However, under DOMA, the survivor of an attempted abortion at any 
prenatal stage of development is defined as a “child” for purposes of all 
federal laws, notwithstanding any contrary state laws that may deny “child” 
status or protection to them.  Consequently, the parents and abortion clinic 
 
 173. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 174. By “gender integration” is meant the integration, making one in marriage, of two 
persons of opposite genders.  Marriage historically has been an important gender-integrating 
social and legal institution.  
 175. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905 (“H.R. 
3396, the Defense of Marriage Act, has two primary purposes.  The first is to defend the 
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage.  The second is to protect the right of the 
States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex 
unions, free from any federal constitutional implications . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also 
id. at 3 (“No State now or at any time in American history has permitted same-sex couples to 
enter into the institution of marriage.”). 
 176. Certainly the categorical descriptions of which legal determinations of parental 
status and rights, and “child[ren],” “child custody,” “child support,” for purposes of Full 
Faith and Credit are rather “sweeping” and “broad,” to mention just one similar example of 
federal domestic relations regulation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006) (full faith and 
credit given to child custody determinations); id. at § 1738B (full faith and credit for child 
support orders).  28 U.S.C. § 1738C is section 2 of DOMA, and was not at issue in 
Massachusetts. 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 177. 1 U.S.C. § 8(a) (2006). 
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staff who fail to provide the survivor “child” with medical assistance might 
be considered perpetrators of “child abuse” and “child neglect” for purposes 
of federal law, even if state law would not consider the survivor as a “child” 
(which is a relationship term, making the progenitors “parents,” for 
purposes of federal law, notwithstanding any state law to the contrary).  
Clearly, that is a “sweeping and broad” use of federal law to define a family 
relationship status for purposes of federal laws and programs. 
(13) The First Circuit simply evaded and refused to consider the deep, 
long, rich, and undeniable history of federal law regulating the federal 
incidents, benefits, privileges, and obligations of family relationships—
particularly marital status.178  The failure to consider this huge body of 
evidence is especially disappointing.  How can the court reach its 
conclusion that Congress has never done anything such as refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriage for purposes of federal law without even 
considering the evidence of what Congress has done in the past in deciding 
what kinds of marriages it will recognize for purposes of federal law?  One 
expects from federal judges more willingness to engage the issues and 
evidence. 
(14) The court correctly notes that in section 3 of DOMA “Congress 
merely defines the terms of the federal benefit.”179  This concession is 
inconsistent with, if not a refutation of, the court’s earlier claim that DOMA 
“intrudes extensively” into the state realm of domestic relations 
regulation.180  It is also inconsistent with, and a refutation of, the court’s 
conclusion that in DOMA “Congress [made an] effort to put a thumb on the 
scales and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage 
laws.”181  In two sequential paragraphs, the court recognizes that Congress 
intended to (and indeed did) regulate only federal programs, but then it 
accuses Congress of really intending to nudge or coerce states into 
forbidding same-sex marriage.182  The court seems to lose grasp of the fact 
that in fulfilling its responsibilities to regulate federal programs and 
benefits, Congress must determine which marriages will be deemed proper 
and eligible for such federal programs, and that in doing so, the federal law 
(whatever it is) will have an unavoidable but fully legitimate, indirect 
influence upon parallel state programs that define marriage differently. 
Consequently, there are several flaws in the court’s reasoning. First, 
recognizing the inevitability of DOMA’s (or any relevant federal law’s) 
ancillary impact on state programs is not an example of exerting illegitimate 
influence or putting a thumb on the scales.  Second, the court refuses to 
consider that if Congress recognizes same-sex marriages for the purposes of 
federal laws and programs, then the inevitable effect of that federal policy 
could be to put its thumb on the scales and influence the states to adopt 
 
 178. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 179. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 12–13. 
 182. See id. 
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same-sex marriage.  Meanwhile, the court’s ruling is itself a big fist on the 
scales, and the collateral effects will be felt no matter the substance of the 
law.  Third, certainly if Congress really had intended DOMA to nudge or 
pressure the states into not allowing same-sex marriage it could easily have 
done much more.  For example, it might have provided in section 2 that 
same-sex marriages could not be recognized in other states (confining 
same-sex marriages to within state borders), rather than simply saying that 
the states could decide for themselves whether to recognize same-sex 
marriages or not.183 
(15) While expressly refusing to “rely upon the charge that DOMA’s 
hidden but dominant purpose was hostility to homosexuality,” the court 
suggests that the record shows an improper purpose, specifically to 
incorporate a forbidden moral viewpoint (“moral disapproval of 
homosexuality”) into the federal law.184  A conspiracy theory lurks!  And 
while theorizing about the immorality of basing federal laws on moral 
considerations (itself a moralistic endeavor), the court overlooks the fact 
that marriage is a moral institution; that the definition of marriage 
inescapably implicates profound moral concerns; and that wherever 
Congress draws the line regarding whether to allow or recognize same-sex 
marriage in federal law the line that is drawn will be a moral line, reflecting 
and reinforcing a moral position.  Thus, the court’s ruling that Congress 
must recognize same-sex marriages for purposes of federal law reflects a 
moral position on a very important issue of public morality that underlies 
important federal laws and programs, no less than DOMA does. So why is 
Congress’s policy decision improperly “moral,” while the court’s is not? 
(16) In addition, the court’s summary disposition of four of the 
justifications for section 3 of DOMA is surprisingly superficial.  For 
example, it declares with unjustified certainty that whether children raised 
by dual-gender couples are “better served” than those raised by same-sex 
couples is irrelevant because Congress cannot prevent same-sex couples in 
Massachusetts from adopting.185  But even assuming the inability of 
Congress to prevent same-sex Massachusetts couples from adopting,186 the 
court misses the point:  if children of same-sex couples are disadvantaged, 
that may be a reason for Congress to exclude same-sex couples from 
eligibility for the many federal programs that are intended either primarily 
or secondarily to support family structures that provide and promote 
advantageous parenting.  Likewise, the court’s dismissal of “freezing” the 
 
 183. More controversially and confrontationally, Congress might have conditioned state 
eligibility for certain federal programs and benefits on not legalizing same-sex marriage. 
 184. See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 15–16. 
 185. See id. at 14. 
 186. Congress has enacted laws forbidding some state adoptions already.  The 
Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 barred categorical prohibition of interracial 
adoptions, 42 U.S.C. § 5115a(b) (2006), and a later amendment prohibited any action to 
“delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the basis of the 
race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved.” 
§ 1996b(1)(B). 
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law for a while seems to miss one important aspect of this rationale—that 
Congress was not changing the law but was merely codifying the status 
quo.  Specifically, Congress preserved the long established understanding 
of marriage, while retaining the authority to change federal law and 
recognize some (or all) same-sex marriages for some (or all) purposes of 
federal law whenever such recognition gained popular support provided, of 
course, it was satisfied that the potential harms of same-sex marriage (such 
as to children) were not a serious risk to federal interests.  Sadly, the court 
seemed to selectively cherry-pick and misstate the justifications for section 
3 that it thought it could dismiss with only cursory discussion. 
(17) The court incorrectly declared:  “Despite its ramifying application 
throughout the U.S. Code, only one day of hearings was held on DOMA . . . 
and none of the testimony concerned DOMA’s effects on the numerous 
federal programs at issue.”187  This is doubly erroneous.  In fact, two days 
of hearings were held, not just one:  one in the House, and another in the 
Senate.188  Likewise, testimony of law professor witnesses (and others) in 
both hearings concerned federalism and DOMA’s effect on federal law and 
programs.189  The First Circuit’s research once again proves unreliable. 
(18) The court seemed frustrated that DOMA is so succinct.  It 
complained that “[t]he statute, only a few paragraphs in length, is devoid of 
the express prefatory findings commonly made in major federal laws.”190  It 
criticizes the “speed with which it was adopted.”191  Neither gratuitous 
comment is relevant to the issue.  Prefatory legislative findings are not part 
of the law, and the record of the two hearings and House Committee Report 
explain in some detail the purpose and need for the law and the intent of 
Congress in adopting it.  Brevity is a virtue, not a flaw, in legislation (and 
court opinions—especially those that are poorly researched). 
(19) The court’s most repeated refrain is that homosexuals and same-sex 
couples are a “historically disadvantaged group” because of historical 
“moral disapproval” of homosexual relations, and that laws discriminating 
against such groups are therefore subject to close judicial scrutiny.192  It 
almost sounds like a reparations justification for striking down DOMA.  
Since gays were marginalized and subject to moral disapproval and legal 
and social discrimination for so long, the court now must bend over 
backwards to prove that both it and the American public are tolerant, 
 
 187. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 13. 
 188. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 189. See, e.g., 1996 Senate Hearing, supra note 77, at 19–23 (statement of Gary L. Bauer, 
Pres., Family Research Council); id. at 42–48 (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Prof., Univ. of 
Chicago); id. at 23–42 (statement of Lynn D. Wardle, Prof. of Law, Brigham Young Univ. 
Law Sch.); 1996 House Hearing, supra note 77, at 87–117 (statement of Hadley Arkes, 
Prof., Amherst Coll.); id. at 149–57 (statement of Maurice J. Holland, Prof. of Law, Univ. of 
Oregon Sch. of Law); id. at 214–28 (statement of Jay Alan Sekulow, Chief Counsel, Am. 
Ctr. for Law and Justice); id. at 158–87 (statement of Lynn D. Wardle, Prof. of Law, 
Brigham Young Univ. Law Sch.). 
 190. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 13. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See, e.g., id. at 14–15. 
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morally neutral, and accepting today by striking down DOMA, which 
seems to reflect the now unpopular traditional moral disapproval of 
homosexual relationships (at least the moral rejection of the claimed 
equivalence of same-sex unions and heterosexual marriages). 
(20) While rejecting the plaintiffs’ Tenth Amendment challenge per se, 
the court used its very thin conclusion that DOMA improperly intruded 
upon state regulation of marriage law improperly to justify its application of 
an intensified level of judicial scrutiny.193  Under that elevated level of 
judicial review the court concluded that “Congress’ denial of federal 
benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts has not 
been adequately supported by any permissible federal interest.”194 
Ultimately, the First Circuit’s decision to strike down DOMA rested on its 
cumulative discomfort about federalism concerns relating to Congress 
defining “marriage” for purposes of federal law, and its discomfort with 
federal discrimination against a category of persons who have long been the 
object of strong moral disapproval and widespread social discrimination.  
The court’s former concern, however, was ill informed and factually 
mistaken, and the self-conscious latter concern largely diverted the court 
from the legal issue it had to decide.  While certainly laudable for these 
concerns, the opinion of the court fails to provide a coherent justification 
for invalidating DOMA. 
(21) There are several strong justifications for section 3 of DOMA that 
the First Circuit did not consider carefully, or at all.  Five such justifications 
can easily be identified.  First, DOMA preserves structural federalism in a 
very important way:  it answers the question of who decides “whether, 
when, and to what extent same-sex marriages created in an American state, 
or elsewhere, will be recognized by the Federal government.”195  
Preservation of Congress’s constitutional authority to make such important 
policy decisions against the efforts to have politically unaccountable courts 
and agencies make those decisions is a significant justification for section 3 
of DOMA.  Section 2 of DOMA makes clear that the states may decide for 
themselves whether or not to recognize same-sex marriages that are valid in 
other states; while section 3, in parallel clarification of structural 
jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal spheres of authority, 
demonstrates that it is for Congress to decide whether or not to recognize 
same-sex marriages for purposes of federal law.196 
Second, substantive federalism is a powerful justification for section 3 of 
DOMA.  Preservation of some distinction between federal substantive law 
and state substantive law is critical.  While Congress often chooses to adopt 
 
 193. “[D]isparate impact on minority interests and federalism concerns both require 
somewhat more in this case than almost automatic deference to Congress’ will, [and] this 
statute fails that test.” Id. at 15. 
 194. Id. at 16. 
 195. Wardle, Section Three of DOMA, supra note 52, at 952; Wardle, Who Decides?, 
supra note 52, at 178. 
 196. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). 
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state domestic relations categories, statuses, and legal consequences for 
purposes of federal law, it is important for Congress to do so, and for 
Congress to distinguish and specifically consider the federal interests 
implicated by the state domestic status which state lawmakers are unlikely 
to have carefully considered, if at all. 
Furthermore, preservation of the traditional federal substantive legal rule 
that only dual-gender unions be treated as marriages in federal law is a 
significant justification.  History is not unimportant.  It is reinforced 
because that traditional rule had been applied successfully and consistently 
for over two centuries. 
Fourth, gathering more evidence about the impacts (positive and 
negative) that flow from same-sex marriage before adopting such a 
dramatic redefinition of marriage for purposes of federal law is a profound 
interest.  While the First Circuit properly declined to “enter the debate” (i.e., 
consider the evidence) over the impact on children and families of legally 
allowing childrearing by same-sex couples,197 legislatures are precisely 
created to consider such issues, and for Congress to decline to change 
policy until it has better evidence upon which to make a rational decision is 
certainly not irrational or improper.198 
Lastly, historical federalism (i.e., the well documented, long established 
tradition of Congress, federal agencies, federal laws and federal rules to 
provide their own, uniquely non-state definitions, status, and incidents of 
state-approved domestic relationships for purposes of federal laws) is a 
powerful justification for DOMA, and a major obstacle to the federalism 
conclusions of the First Circuit (and, hence, not surprisingly, a major lacuna 
in the court’s opinion).  Although changes through democratic processes 
sometimes come more slowly than some judges may prefer, the continuity 
and stability of the democratic process is itself valuable and important for 
courts to respect. 
As reasonable persons may differ, it is possible that not all of these 
justifications would persuade all persons of section 3’s validity.  But there 
is no excuse for competent and unbiased federal judges to fail to thoroughly 
consider all (let alone any) of them. 
 
 197. Massachusetts, 382 F.3d at 14. 
 198. Indeed, on the very issue of the impact of same-sex parenting on children noted by 
the court, several thorough studies of extensive data by reputable scholars caution against the 
popular “no-difference” slogans and suggested that, indeed, children raised by same-sex 
couples may be disadvantaged as compared to children raised by dual-gender parents. See 
generally Loren Marks, Same-Sex Parenting and Children’s Outcomes:  A Closer 
Examination of the American Psychological Association’s Brief on Lesbian and Gay 
Parenting, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 735 (2012); Mark Regnerus, How Different Are the Adult 
Children of Parents Who Have Same-Sex Relationships?  Findings from the New Family 
Structures Study, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 752 (2012). 
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D.  Judicial Efforts to Overturn DOMA Are Improper 
A disturbing aspect of the First Circuit and all of the other recent DOMA 
decisions is how political the courts’ decisions seem to have been.  
Massachusetts is only one example of the politically tainted, factually 
strained, and analytically inadequate opinions rendered on the Act.  There 
are other manifestations of political influences and showmanship.  For 
example, in a stunning show of political solidarity with the same-sex 
marriage movement, the decision of a federal bankruptcy judge for the 
Central District of California that DOMA was invalid was co-signed by 
nineteen other bankruptcy judges of that court.199  While such extrajudicial, 
attention grabbing showmanship would deserve an “A” for a political action 
(it would be great campaign publicity for elected officials), it deserves an 
“F” for propriety and appropriateness for judges whose judicial impartiality 
and non-political neutrality were clearly compromised.  It seems that since 
the political branches have been unwilling to repeal DOMA, some courts 
are willing to perform the political work for them.  This raises very 
problematic separation of powers concerns. 
Should DOMA be repealed or overturned, legal recognition in federal 
law of same-sex marriages would not necessarily result.200  However, the 
political waves from such a decision would support such an interpretation 
by executive agencies or judges, and it is likely that federal agencies would 
soon recognize same-sex marriages.201  Moreover, invalidating or repealing 
 
 199. In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 579 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 200. See generally Titshaw, supra note 63, at 610 (“If DOMA were repealed or struck 
down, that would not result in a clear, uniform rule recognizing all same-sex marriages under 
the INA.”); id. at 537–38 (“A systematic review of the case law, however, reveals that U.S. 
Attorneys General, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), immigration officials, and 
most federal courts have consistently applied the same standards to determine marriage 
validity under the INA.  These standards have been employed in dozens of cases involving 
biracial marriage, marriage between close relatives, marriage involving minors, marriage 
involving transgender spouses, proxy marriage, polygamy, and even same-sex marriage 
before DOMA.”).  The three standards are:  (1) validity of marriage where celebrated, 
(2) strong public policy exceptions, and (3) bona fides of the particular marriage. Id. at 550 
(“If valid where celebrated, a marriage is generally presumed to be valid under U.S. 
immigration law as well.  There are, however, exceptions based on both state and federal 
public policy.  If a couple’s state of domicile has a very strong public policy objection to a 
particular category of marriage, as expressed through criminal sanctions against the 
underlying relationship or sanctions against marriage in another state as an evasion of the 
domicile’s marriage law, an exception will be recognized under the INA.  Four federal 
public policy exceptions have also been recognized in the cases of unconsummated proxy 
marriages, polygamy, ‘sham marriages,’ and same-sex marriage, all coinciding with express 
provisions in relevant federal statutes indicating direct or indirect objection to a marriage or 
its underlying relationship.”); id. at 610 (“If DOMA is repealed or struck down, same-sex 
marriages should be recognized under the INA so long as they are bona fide and valid where 
celebrated and the couple’s state of domicile has no strong public policy objection.”). 
 201. See The Respect for Marriage Act:  Assessing the Impact of DOMA on American 
Families:  Hearing on S. 598 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 37 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 Senate Hearing] (statement of Edward Whelan, Pres., Ethics and Pub. 
Policy Ctr., Washington, D.C.) (“The effect and the evident purpose of the bill is to have the 
Federal Government validate so-called same-sex marriage by requiring that it treat as 
marriage for purposes of Federal law any such union recognized as a marriage under State 
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DOMA would encourage (with a big “thumb on the scales”) states to 
recognize same-sex marriages to avoid the discrepancy between state law 
and federal law.202 
E.  Why Protection of “Thick” Dual-Gender Marital Relationships 
Exclusively As Legal Marriages Is Profoundly 
Important, Rational, and Compelling 
All states regulate marriage.  Proposals to get the state out of the 
marriage business are naïve, at best, and dishonest, at bottom, because of 
the serious policy implications for the state.  For instance, the responsibility 
of the state to determine the validity of Hal’s marriage to 7-year-old 
Wendy, or to both Wendy and Wanda, or to Sam, or to both Sam and 
Wanda, or to his pet dog, and/or sheep, and/or filly for purposes of the state 
laws and programs (e.g., wrongful death, loss of consortium, spousal 
privileges and immunities, state tax exemptions, inheritance, state welfare 
and employment benefits, divorce education) does not go away by simply 
saying that the state is getting out of giving marriage licenses.  The 
dilemma of deciding who is eligible for state benefits that have historically 
been associated with marriage cannot be evaded by abolishing state 
recognition of marriage altogether.  As Edward Stein put it, “Whatever 
agenda the state is advancing by channeling people into marriage—whether 
it benefits the couple, their future children, or the state generally—would be 
 
law.  The bill would require taxpayers in the States that maintain traditional marriage laws to 
subsidize the provision of Federal benefits to same-sex unions entered into in other States.”); 
Jay Strozdas, Trendlines:  Court Decisions, Proposed Legislation, and Their Likely Impact 
on Binational Same-Sex Families, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1339, 1355 (Summer 2011) (“If 
Congress were to repeal DOMA, same-sex binational couples would need to look no further 
than the INA for immigration equality. . . .  A congressional repeal would show the federal 
government’s clear intent to recognize that all marriages are valid where they were 
performed.”); Tom Cohen, Defense of Marriage Act:  Senate Panel Passes Repeal of 
Defense of Marriage Act, CNN (Nov. 10, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-
10/politics/politics_senate-doma_1_defense-of-marriage-act-couples-marriage-between-one-
man?_s=PM:POLITICS (repeal of DOMA would “provide equal federal benefits to legally 
married same-sex couples”); Larry Margasak, DOMA Repeal Bill Clears Senate Judiciary 
Committee Vote, HUFFINGTON POST, (Nov. 10. 2011, 1:31 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/11/10/defense-of-marriage-act-repeal-bill-democrats-_n_1086237.html.  
Senator Grassley notes that DOMA repeal bill would create federal benefits for lawfully 
married same-sex couples and for many same-sex couples who are not lawfully married. Id. 
 202. See 2011 Senate Hearing, supra note 201, at 22 (answer of Thomas Minnery, Senior 
Vice President for Public Policy, Focus on the Family, Colorado Springs, CO to Sen. 
Grassley’s question) (“And if DOMA were to be repealed, presumably same-sex marriages 
performed elsewhere would have to be recognized in those States, those many States that 
have determined that marriage is what it has always been in their States.  And with that 
comes a very forced political correctness which can get downright nasty.”); Charles P. 
Kindregan, Jr., Learning From History:  The Federal Union and Marriage, 20 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & SOC. JUST. 67 (Winter 2011) (repeal of DOMA “would be a powerful symbol of the 
principle of fairness” to the states); Bill to Repeal DOMA Demonstrates Ongoing Disregard 
for the American People, ALLIANCE DEF. FUND (Sept. 16, 2009), www.adfmedia.org/
news/prdetail/?cid=9046 (arguing that bill to repeal DOMA would “open[] the door for 
litigation that would seek to force states to recognize ‘marriages’ between members of the 
same sex”). 
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lost if marriage is deregulated.”203  Moreover, “the time and energy courts 
must spend dealing with the dissolution of relationships would increase 
dramatically under deregulation because of the countless different marriage 
contracts that courts would need to interpret.”204  Thus, it is not surprising 
that no state has deregulated marriage. 
The meaning of marriage is changing in at least those states that allow 
same-sex marriage.  It is morphing from a “thick” to a “thin” concept of 
marriage.  But this is not the first “thinning” of marriage by legal reform.  
The adoption of unilateral no-fault divorce in the 1960s and 1970s also 
transformed marriage from a more robust, deep, committed relationship to a 
more anemic, tentative, transitory and shallow relationship.205 
In legal policy and administration, the ideal of romanticism (“marry 
whomever he or she wants”) quickly devolves into incoherence.  By 
leveling emotions, treating all forms and kinds of emotion as equal, the 
most socially valuable emotions are diminished and the most trivial are 
enhanced—equating good emotions with bad.206  Thus, it is not surprising 
that the opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge 
v. Department of Public Health207 reads like the judicial equivalent of 
Woody Allen’s famous self-justifying quip:  “The heart wants what it 
wants.”208  That unstable, romanticized emotionalism is at the core of the 
new, “thin” version of marriage. 
 
 203. Edward Stein, Looking Beyond Full Relationship Recognition for Couples 
Regardless of Sex:  Abolition, Alternatives, and/or Functionalism, 28 LAW & INEQ. 345, 360 
(2010); see also id. at 371 (“I would reject abolition [of marriage], at least in the form of 
deregulation, as both impractical and theoretically problematic.”). 
 204. Id. at 360.  Professor Stein also notes that deregulation generally would lead to less 
marriage, not more, and increase the importance of (and loss of autonomy resulting from) the 
application of “default rules.” Id. at 359. 
 205. See generally PATRICK PARKINSON, FAMILY LAW AND THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF 
PARENTHOOD  (2011); LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:  
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000); 
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN, JULIA M. LEWIS & SANDRA BLAKESLY, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY 
OF DIVORCE (2000); NICHOLAS H. WOLFINGER, UNDERSTANDING THE DIVORCE CYCLE:  THE 
CHILDREN OF DIVORCE IN THEIR OWN MARRIAGES (2005); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault 
Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79. 
 206. Perhaps it is the moral notion that there is a “good” and “bad” in matters of intimate, 
emotional life that is the real objection of romantics.   
 207. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 208. Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag:  An Essay on Wigs, Robes and Legal Change, 
1995 WIS. L. REV. 1129, 1129 n.1 (“‘The heart wants what it wants,’ says Woody.” (citing 
Ellen Goodman, A Reel of the Real Woody Allen, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1992, at 19)). 
See generally Lynn D. Wardle, All You Need Is Love? 14 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 
51 (2004) (discussing emotion as a core ingredient in relationships today).  The Woody 
Allen–Soon-Yi Previn affair is a notable example of the kind of destruction that results from 
the reign of unconstrained personal emotions.  Woody Allen and Mia Farrow lived together 
for many years out of wedlock, had a child together, and Allen adopted at least one of 
Farrow’s children.  Later he began an affair with another of Mia Farrow’s adopted children, 
teenager Soon-Yi Previn.  When that relationship came to light, Allen explained his behavior 
with the quip, “the heart wants what it wants.”  The Allen-Farrow relationship ended, and a 
custody dispute regarding the couple’s children resulted.  A New York trial court awarded 
custody of Moses, Dylan, and Satchel Farrow to Mia Farrow, and granted Allen only 
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Increasingly, marriage has been subjectified and personalized.  The 
personal and subjective qualities associated with or desired in marriages 
have come to replace the objective and socially necessary requirements that 
previously defined marriage.  Just as subjective “intent” has become a 
popularly proposed (and in some cases actual decisional) basis for defining 
who is a legal parent,209 we are also seeing the replacement of objective 
marriage criteria with subjective criteria and the rise of intentionality as the 
controlling factor in defining the public status and the public trust of 
marriage.  This is an example of the shift from public morality to private 
morality in family law noted decades ago by Professor Carl Schneider,210 
the privatization of family law noted by Professor Jana Singer,211 and of the 
even older movement from status to contract noted a century and a half ago 
by Professor Maine.212  Thus, concerns that marriage is losing its social 
significance and in many ways being marginalized and trivialized are not 
without some factual basis.213  
 
restricted visitation.  Allen appealed.  The New York appellate court found that Allen’s 
sexual relationship with Farrow’s adoptive daughter, Soon-Yi Previn, demonstrated Allen’s 
“tendency to place inappropriate emphasis on his own wants and needs and to minimize and 
even ignore those of his children” and “an absence of any parenting skills.” Allen v. Farrow, 
611 N.Y.S.2d 859, 862 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).  In light of Farrow’s allegations that Allen 
sexually abused Dylan, the court found that visitation during sessions with a therapist would 
be in Dylan’s best interests. Id. at 863.  In addition, the court determined that supervised 
visitation with Satchel was appropriate because, if unsupervised, Allen may “influence 
Satchel inappropriately, and disregard the impact [that] exposure to Mr. Allen’s relationship 
with Satchel’s sister, Ms. Previn, would have on the child.” Id. at 863–64.  Unsupervised 
visitation would be “detrimental to the best interests of the children.” Id. at 864; see also 
Nancy S. Erickson, The Role of the Law Guardian in a Custody Case Involving Domestic 
Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 821 n.17 (2000); Abbe Smith, Carrying On In 
Criminal Court:  When Criminal Defense Is Not So Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 723, 730 n.33 (1995); Margaret Tortorella, When Supervised Visitation Is In the Best 
Interests of the Child, 30 FAM. L.Q. 199, 199 (1996); Richard Perez-Peña, Woody Allen Tells 
of Affair as Custody Battle Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1993, at A25 (Allen testified in a 
custody hearing that he had given “little thought” to how his affair with Farrow’s adopted 
daughter, Soon-Yi Previn, would affect the other children). 
 209. See K. Daniels, Is Blood Really Thicker than Water? Assisted Reproduction and Its 
Impact on Our Thinking About Family, 26 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
265 (2005); Gillian Douglas, The Intention to be a Parent and the Making of Mothers, 57 
MOD. L. REV. 636 (1994); Linda S. Maule & Karen Schmid, Assisted Reproduction and the 
Courts:  The Case of California, 27 J. FAM. ISSUES 464 (2006); see also Perri Koll, Note, The 
Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Rights of Intended Homosexual Male Parents in 
Surrogacy Custody Disputes, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 199 (2011).  I am indebted to my 
student, Rebecca N. Skabelund, whose paper stimulated these thoughts and brought these 
sources to my attention. 
 210. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family 
Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985). 
 211. See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443. 
 212. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 141 (Dorset Press 1986) (1861) (“[T]he 
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract.”). 
 213. Compare Lynn Curwin, Woman in Taiwan Plans to Marry Herself, DIGITAL J. (Oct. 
23, 2010), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/299295, and Frank Lake, Woman Marries 
Herself, WKLY WORLD NEWS (Oct. 24, 2010), http://weeklyworldnews.com/headlines/
24040/woman-marries-herself/ (“The Little White Wedding Chapel in Las Vegas is 
 2012] INVOLUNTARY IMPORTS 817 
The general and legal iconization of romance and emotionalism actually 
undermines the socially constructed boundaries of socially-beneficial 
family relationships.  Susan Bandes has acknowledged that “the law cannot 
accommodate the endless subtleties and variations that might exist among 
emotional states . . . .  [At some point] these variables render the translation 
into legal context impossible.”214 
Today our society tends to paste the generic label of love on many 
different emotions, but the ancient Greeks used at least three separate words 
to describe different facets or kinds of love:  eros, agape, and philia.  “The 
eros tradition, of course, begins with Plato’s account of eros in the 
Symposium . . . .  The agape tradition begins with the many passages in the 
New Testament . . . .  [H]ere Jesus is the exemplar.  [T]he philia tradition 
begins with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics . . . .”215  Eros has been 
described as 
acquisitive, egocentric or even selfish; agape is a giving love, a love that 
makes even the supreme sacrifice for the sake of the beloved.  Eros is an 
 
reporting that women have been making arrangements to marry themselves in small 
ceremonies.”), and Piper Weiss, Bride Marries Herself.  Should More Singles Throw Solo 
Weddings?, SHINE (Mar. 16, 2012), http://shine.yahoo.com/love-sex/bride-marries-herself-
more-singles-throw-solo-weddings-202200537.html), with Human-Animal Marriage, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human-animal_marriage (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) 
(citing to cases of humans marrying cows, horses, dogs, goats, and snakes), and Marry Your 
Pet:  The Pet and People Wedding Specialists, MARRYYOURPET.COM, http://www.marry
yourpet.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012), and Man Charged With Sexually Abusing Animals, 
10TV.COM (June 16, 2011), http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/2011/06/16/story-shelby-
man-charged-with-animal-abuse-sex.html (noting that the neighbor of arrested man “recalled 
the day last month when she saw Bower bring his dog home from the shelter.  ‘He had a sign 
that said, ‘Just Married,’ DeLeon said.  ‘I was (thinking) who in the world did he get married 
to?  I didn’t see it in the paper, and (I found out) he was talking about his dog, Tara.’”), and 
People Marry Animals Trying to Find Happiness, PRAVDA.RU (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://english.pravda.ru/society/sex/01-04-2008/104741-marry_animals-0/ (“For example, in 
June 2003 a nine-year-old Indian girl married a mongrel. . . .  Another incident occurred in 
Nepal in 2004.  A 75-year-old man married a dog to provide himself a guarantee of 
immortality. . . .  In 2005 [41-year-old British rock-concert producer Sharon Tendler] 
married Cindy, a 35-year-old dolphin . . . .  [A]n Indian woman from Orissa decided to 
marry a snake.”); see also A Vow Against Gentrification:  Seattle Woman “Marries” a 
Warehouse, L.A. TIMES, (Jan. 30, 2012, 11:46 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
nationnow/2012/01/gay-marriage-warehouse-seattle-babylonia.html (story and picture of 
protestor Babylonia Aivaz in wedding dress, who said “I’m doing this to show the building 
how much I love it . . . .”); Patrick Hickey Jr., Seattle Woman Marries Warehouse to Protest 
Gentrification, NBCChicago (Jan. 31, 2012, 3:04 PM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/
news/weird/138425604.html (Occupy Seattle protestor marries an abandoned warehouse).  
That is not the fault of same-sex couples but it does provide the context in which their claims 
for redefining marriage to include same-sex couples creates serious concerns about the 
impact that would have upon the essential social institution of marriage.  Thus, it is not 
unreasonable (but, rather, may be critically important) for lawmakers now to clarify what 
kind and qualities of love are relevant to contemporary family law and marriage. 
 214. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 13 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 
1999). 
 215. Alan Soble, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Love, in EROS, AGAPE AND PHILIA, 
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE xxiii (Alan Soble ed., 1989).  Plato described a ladder 
of erotic love with four stages. Id. at xxii–xxiii. 
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unconstant, unfaithful love, while agape is unwavering and continues to 
give despite ingratitude. . . .  Eros is a love that responds to the merit or 
value of its object, while agape creates value in its object as a result of 
loving it, and exists independently of . . . any merit or lack of merit in its 
object. . . .  (Philia gets caught in the cracks between or among them.)216 
Philia, meanwhile, might be called a perfect friendship.217 
The “thin” form of marriage, based essentially on romantic or sexual 
attraction (eros), is not the foundation of the kinds of marriages that provide 
a solid foundation for long term parenting or a stable, strong, and free 
society.  In the “thicker” form of marriage, romantic love (agape) is 
sustained and enriched by and grounded in other relational qualities such as 
constancy, fidelity, patience, kindness, long suffering, and commitment.  
Those qualities are the true foundation of all family relations, and those 
kinds of marriages and family relations comprise the foundation of our 
republican system of government.  Family policies should reinforce those 
emotions that nurture stability and happiness in marriage, parenting, and 
families.218 
The “thick” conception of marriage is not merely a personal construct or 
instrument for personal romantic fulfillment, but entails the mutual 
assumption of a public trust.  Specifically, the “thick” conception of 
marriage demands a mutual commitment by a complementary, gender 
integrated couple to a common social goal, a vision of a common endeavor, 
the lifelong nurturing and development of which enriches the lives of not 
only the spouses themselves, but also the lives of their children, their 
extended families, their communities, and all of their society. 
CONCLUSION 
These are serious and important questions of substance and structure, and 
deciding them should not be corrupted by (to borrow the First Circuit’s 
metaphor) the thumb of improper political outcome favoritism or corrupt 
popularity influences.219  This has happened before.  The abortion 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is one ongoing, glaring example.  
Moderate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put it well when she observed, 
“This Court’s abortion decisions have already worked a major distortion in 
 
 216. Id. at xxiii. 
 217. Id. at 57. 
 218. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional 
Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 355–61 (2003) (remarking that strong family relations 
are the foundation of republican government); Wardle, All You Need Is Love?, supra note 
208, at 60–65 (discussing the confusion of love and romance); Wardle, Tyranny, supra note 
15, at 222–49 (portraying marriage as the foundation for U.S. constitutional government).  
 219. See Andrew Koppelman, Madisonian Pornography or, the Importance of Jeffrey 
Sherman, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 601 (2009) (listing alleged distortions of scientific 
evidence in formulating law and regulations “such as abortion, abstinence education, and 
stem cell research, and issues with significant economic consequences for the President’s 
large corporate supporters, such as workplace safety and global warming”). 
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the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.”220  Conservative Justice Antonin 
Scalia, likewise, opined in another case, “There is apparently no end to the 
distortion of our First Amendment law that the Court is willing to endure in 
order to sustain this restriction upon the free speech of abortion 
opponents.”221  Liberal philosopher Ronald Dworkin agrees, noting,  
“Abortion is tearing America apart.  It is also distorting its politics, and 
confounding its constitutional law.”222  Indeed, Roe v. Wade,223 the font of 
the Court’s abortion doctrine, was itself based upon a vast array of 
distortions.224  Some have described the Court’s pattern of disregarding 
constitutional law principles and precedents when deciding abortion cases 
as the “abortion distortion.”225 
Sadly, we see the same distorting dynamics at work in some courts’ and 
legislatures’ response to legal claims and law reform efforts aimed at 
legalizing same-sex marriage.226  The criticisms of Professors Borchers, 
Brilmayer, Whitten, and others, noted above, have suggested that pro-same-
sex-marriage legal commentators have misrepresented conflict of laws and 
 
 220. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 
(1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 221. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 753 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 222. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION:  AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 4 (1993). 
 223. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  For a discussion of the shortcomings of the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence, see Charles I. Lugosi, Respecting Human Life in 21st Century America:  A 
Moral Perspective to Extend Civil Rights to the Unborn from Creation to Natural Death, 20 
ISSUES L. & MED. 211, 241 (2005) (“Case law abounds with bizarre judicial holdings that 
distort precedents to avoid undermining the right to an abortion.”); Elizabeth S. Saylor, 
Federalism and the Family After Morrison:  An Examination of the Child Support Recovery 
Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, and a Federal Law Outlawing Gun 
Possession by Domestic Violence Abusers, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 123 n.347 (2002) 
(“Supreme Court cases concerning abortion are notoriously at odds with other precedent.  
Strong feelings on both sides of the abortion debate encourage judges to distort doctrine to 
support their own view.”). 
 224. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Abortion and the Law:  Blackmun’s Distortion 
of the Historical Record, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION:  REVERSING ROE V. WADE 
THROUGH THE COURTS 137–58 (Dennis J. Horan et al., eds., 1987); JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, 
DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY (2006); Robert A. Destro, Abortion and the 
Constitution:  The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975); 
see also Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name:  The Abortion 
Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159, 160–67 (describing the distortion of standing doctrine in the 
original abortion cases). 
 225. See, e.g., Jill Hamers, Note, Reeling in the Outlier:  Gonzales v. Carhart and the End 
of Facial Challenges to Abortion Statutes, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1071 n.10 (2009) (citing 
Teresa Stanton Collett, Gonzales v. Carhart and Judge Easterbrook’s Pickle, SCOTUSBLOG, 
(Apr. 19, 2007, 6:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/04/gonzales-v-carhart-and-
judge-easterbrooks-pickle/); see also Shannen W. Coffin, The Abortion Distortion:  What the 
‘Pro-Choice’ People Have Done to Law, Medicine, and Language, NAT’L REV., July 12, 
2004, at 22. 
 226. See Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving:  Reflections on the 
“Loving Analogy” for Same-Sex Marriage, 51 HOW. L.J. 117, 165–66 (2007) (“The same 
tactic of ‘capturing marriage’ as a means of promoting a political ideology lies at the heart of 
the movement to legalize same-sex marriage today.  The redefinition of marriage to include 
same-sex couples would, once again, distort the basic social institution of marriage and 
impress marriage law into the service of a social reconstruction (gay rights) movement.”). 
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full faith and credit doctrines.227  Another respected law professor charges 
that some “conflicts scholars [are] distorting the law of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause in the service of the cause of same-sex marriage.”228  
Meanwhile, two other respected professors have similarly opined, “[W]e 
think the conflict over same-sex marriage has distorted discussion about the 
institution of marriage in extraordinary ways.”229 
Examples of the political distortion effect of the same-sex marriage 
movement are numerous, and are not limited to the United States.  For 
instance, one of the most fascinating recent examples occurred in Canada 
when two married lesbian women, one from the United Kingdom and the 
other from Florida, sought a divorce in Toronto after previously celebrating 
their marriage in Canada.230  The Canadian DOJ suggested that under long 
settled Canadian law applying lex domicilii to determine whether parties 
could contract a valid marriage, the foreign lesbian couple’s marriage was 
not valid,231 nor were the parties eligible to file for divorce because they 
had not satisfied the one-year residency requirement necessary to obtain a 
divorce.232  Both of those rules were uncontroversial and long-settled prior 
 
 227. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 228. Earl M. Maltz, Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Politics of Legal 
Scholarship, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 533, 542 (2005). 
 229. Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Why the Case for Amending the U.S. 
Constitution to Prohibit or Regulate Gay Marriage Is “Not Proved,” 32 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 637, 648 (2005); see also Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I):  From 
Status/Contract to the Marriage System, 6 UNBOUND:  HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 58 (2010) 
(critiquing the “distortions produced by the idea that marriage is status,” embraced by both 
sides of the same-sex marriage debate). 
 230. See Kirk Makin, Despite Legal About-Face, Harper Has “No Intention” of 
Reopening Gay Marriage, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 12, 2012 3:59 AM), http://www.theglobe
andmail.com/news/politics/despite-legal-about-face-harper-has-no-intention-of-reopening-
same-sex-marriage/article1358276/; see also Same-Sex Marriage Law Change Addresses 
Divorce, CBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2012, 7:32 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
story/2012/02/17/gay-marriage-loophole.html (“The proposed changes have been prompted 
by a divorce case in Ontario involving a same-sex couple.  The unidentified lesbian couple 
married in Canada in 2005 but split up in 2009.  The partners are living in Florida and the 
United Kingdom.  Both women want a divorce, but cannot get one where they now live 
because the state of Florida does not recognize their marriage, and though the U.K. grants 
civil partnerships to same-sex couples, it does not recognize the Canadian marriage.”). 
 231. See Makin, supra note 230 (“[A] Department of Justice lawyer says their marriage is 
not legal in Canada since they could not have lawfully wed in Florida or England, where the 
two partners reside.”). 
 232. Cameron French, Canada to Close Loophole on Foreigner Gay Marriages, REUTERS 
(Jan. 13, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/us-marriage-
idUSTRE80B20U20120113 (“In court submissions, the [Canadian] Justice Department said 
the marriage of the two women was not legally valid under Canadian law because the 
women could not have lawfully wed in England or Florida.  It also cited the Canada Divorce 
Act, which says any couple seeking to end a marriage in Canada must have lived there for a 
year.”); Makin, supra note 230 (“[An attorney in the Canadian Department of Justice] tied 
the federal position to two central propositions.  First, he said, couples who came to Canada 
to be married must live in the country for at least a year before they can obtain a divorce.  
Second, same-sex marriages are legal in Canada only if they are also legal in the home 
country or state of the couple”); see also Liston, supra note 12 (“Divorce proceedings 
between an American woman and a British woman—who cannot be named for legal 
reasons—have exposed a restriction in Canadian law which says that non-Canadian same-
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to their application to this same-sex couple, but nevertheless provoked a 
remarkable firestorm of criticism in the media.233  This reaction led to 
immediate political “damage control” public relations responses from the 
Canadian Justice Department,234 and quickly prompted the introduction of a 
bill in the Parliament of Canada to modify the well-established marriage 
eligibility choice of law rules, as well as the long-settled durational 
residency for divorce rule.235  Despite the settled, unremarkable, 
reasonable, and common Canadian law of marriage eligibility and divorce 
durational residency, Canadian politicians were almost tripping over 
themselves in the race to assure the country and the same-sex marriage 
advocates that the existing laws would surely and immediately be altered to 
accommodate tourist marriages in Canada by foreign same-sex couples, and 
to allow tourist divorces in Canada by foreign same-sex couples who had 
married in Canada.  In short order, even before the hearing in the Canadian 
case that caused the furor, a bill was introduced in Parliament to ensure that 
foreign same-sex couples could get married in Canada, despite contrary 
domiciliary laws, and would be able to get divorced without residence in 
Canada as well.236  Since the Canadian constitutional principle under which 
same-sex marriage was legalized was “equality,” it seems indisputable that 
if foreign same-sex couples can evade their domiciliary marriage laws and 
get validly married in Canada, foreign heterosexual couples also must be 
allowed to get married in Canada in evasion of the marriage restrictions of 
their domiciles that would prevent them from getting married in their home 
states.  Likewise, equality would seem to compel the conclusion that if 
 
sex couples cannot marry unless gay marriage is lawful in their home states or countries.”); 
supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 233. See Cristin Schmitz, Feds Fading in Face of Furor, LAWYERS WKLY, Jan. 27, 2012, 
at 1, available at http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&volume=31&
number=35&article=1; see also Makin, supra note 230; Janyce McGregor, Same-Sex 
Divorce Options Explored by Harper Government, CBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2012, 10:43 AM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/01/12/pol-harper-same-sex-marriage.html; Laura 
Payton, Conservatives to Change Civil Marriage Law, CBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2012, 12:56 
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/01/13/pol-same-sex-marriage-nicholson
.html; Same-Sex Marriage Law Change Addresses Divorce, supra note 230. 
 234. Josh Visser, Justice Minister Says All Same-Sex Marriages ‘Valid’, CTV NEWS (Jan. 
13, 2012, 9:41 PM), http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/QPeriod/20120113/gay-marriage-legal-
nicholson-120113/. 
 235. Mattew Pomy, Canada to Change Marriage Law to Legally Recognize All Non-
Resident Same-Sex Marriages, JURIST (Jan. 15, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://jurist.org/
paperchase/2012/01/canada-to-change-marriage-law-to-legally-recognize-all-non-resident-
same-sex-marriages.php. 
 236. See The Civil Marriage of Non-Residents Act, House of Commons of Canada, Bill 
C-32, 1st Sess., 41st Parliament, 60-61 Elizabeth II (2011–2012), available at 
http://parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=53959
19&File=24#1; see also Cynthia Kirkby, Legislative Summary of Bill C-32:  An Act to 
Amend the Civil Marriage Act, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS (Mar. 9, 
2012), http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?ls=c32
&Parl=41&Ses=1&source=library_prb&Language=E; Same-Sex Marriage Law Change 
Addresses Divorce, CBC NEWS, (Feb. 17, 2012, 7:32 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
story/2012/02/17/gay-marriage-loophole.html?cmp=rss (discussing the new divorce process 
established by the act). 
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foreign same-sex couples who previously married in Canada can obtain 
divorces despite not having resided in Canada for one year before filing for 
divorce, then, so also must Canada allow foreign dual-gender couples 
previously married in Canada to file for divorce even though they have not 
resided in Canada for one year.  In other words, the revision (or distortion) 
of the Canadian family law to accommodate “quickie” marriages and 
“quickie” divorces by foreign same-sex couples threatens to totally revamp 
and distort the Canadian marriage and divorce law system. 
It was interesting to see traditionally proper Canadian leaders clamoring 
to quickly amend their laws in order to ensure that Canada is not only the 
“Reno” for same-sex marriage in North America (and for the British 
Commonwealth nations), but that it is also the “Reno” for divorce of 
foreigners who enter into Canadian same-sex marriages, as well.  One 
cannot repress the irreverent suspicion that had such profound and hasty 
law changes been suggested because dual-gender foreign couples were 
having trouble getting into or out of marriage in Canada, the political 
response and legal proceedings might have been quite different.237  The 
same-sex marriage element immediately produced a remarkable about-face 
by the Canadian Justice Department and provoked a proposed amendment 
that would drastically distort (essentially overturn) both the marriage 
validity choice-of-law rule and the durational-residency-for-divorce rule.238  
The ultimate outcome in the case is not yet clear; as of April 10, 2012, two 
months after the scheduled February hearing, the case was reportedly still 
“drag[ging] on,”239 and by mid-June 2012, the bill introduced to amend the 
Civil Marriage Act had gone no further than its first reading (on February 
17).240  Canada seems to be satisfied for the time being with a double 
standard in marriage and divorce law—with the strict written law applicable 
only to heterosexual couples.  This disconcerting stalemate hints not only of 
the complexity of the transportability of marital status issue but also 
indicates that the true course of the law and legal proceedings involving 
 
 237. The same Canadian political leaders just might have recited the virtues of their long 
established legal rules, and the vices of their government aiding and abetting evasive 
marriages of foreigners and tourist divorces, and concluded that it would be unseemly, 
improper, and beneath the dignity of Canadian marriage law.  Instead, the world has been 
treated to an entertaining political farce. 
 238. See supra notes 230–35 and accompanying text. 
 239. Michael Woods, Foreign Same-Sex Couple’s Bid for Divorce Drags On, 
THESTAR.COM (Apr. 10, 2012) http://www.thestar.com/news/crime/article/1159390-foreign-
same-sex-couple-s-bid-for-divorce-drags-on (“The foreign same-sex couple who married in 
Toronto and are seeking a divorce aren’t much closer to getting their wish, the lawyer 
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 240. See Status of An Act to Amend the Civil Marriage Act, LEGISINFO, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Mode=1&billId=5387766&Language=E 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“Last Stage Completed, Introduction and First Reading in the 
House of Commons (2012-02-17)”); see also Woods, supra note 239. 
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some issues can be profoundly distorted and even disastrously diverted by 
political forces.  Marital status regarding same-sex couples is one of those 
very vulnerable issues at the present time. 
This leads to the concluding point of this article:  the importance of 
modesty, moderation, prudence, and perspective of those who exercise and 
influence government authority cannot be understated.  Advocates of LGBT 
rights, including proponents of same-sex marriage, find themselves today 
(after a lot of hard work and effective advocacy and complementary social 
developments) with significant popularity, growing political power, and 
notable legal influence in many jurisdictions.  This seems to be the “gay 
moment” in the United States and in much of the western world,241 and it 
probably will last for several years.  But eventually, it will pass; another 
movement will replace it; another “moment” will arrive, as always.  What 
will remain is the legacy of how the gay community used the power and 
influence it had in the “gay moment” of history.  If the leaders and 
influential members of the gay community are gracious, considerate, 
reasonable, fair, tolerant and responsible, the effects and influences in law 
and society of this transitory “gay moment” in history will probably be long 
lasting and significant.  On the other hand, if those leaders exercise their 
influence in petty, unethical, intolerant, retaliatory, or punitive ways, it will 
discredit the “gay moment” and the gay rights movement for generations to 
come, and will significantly reduce the long term impact of the legal and 
public policy and social changes it initiated.  
 Intolerance of the expression of opposing viewpoints, and indecent 
behavior towards those who advocate disfavored positions, arguments, and 
policies is socially destructive.  Our constitutional system requires the ethic 
and practice of tolerance.  As distinguished Professor William N. Eskridge 
put it: 
The LGBT social movement wants to persuade America that gay is good, 
while the traditional family values (TFV) countermovement wants to 
persuade American that many gay rights would undermine the family, 
marriage, and other cherished institutions.  This is a fine debate for 
America to have.  The Court is simply insisting [and legal academics, 
especially, also should insist] that the players not hit below the belt and 
turn a fair fight into a brawl.242 
 Tolerance functions to protects individual rights and personal autonomy 
by “permitting dissent and by affirmatively protecting minorities from 
private violence or discrimination.”243  It “obviates the need to indulge in 
the collective self-deception that the state can be substantively neutral 
 
 241. See Andrew Kopkind, The Gay Moment, NATION, May 3, 1993, at 577; Elizabeth 
Kastor, The Gay Moment:  Today Just Didn’t Happen.  It Took a Lot of Yesterdays, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 25, 1993, at F1; Richard Brookhiser, The Gay Moment, NAT’L REV., July 26, 
1999, at 42. 
 242. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance:  Judicial Review 
to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2004). 
 243. Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 333 (1990).  
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among competing values.”244  As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, 
“The[] fundamental values of ‘habits and manners of civility’ essential to a 
democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political 
and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular.”245  
Promoting indecency toward those who express disliked views is intolerant, 
dangerous, and inconsistent with the core principles and purposes of our 
American constitutional system and of legitimate legal scholarship.246 
 So there are significant practical and political reasons that supplement 
profound ethical and civic virtue reasons for the exercise of prudence by 
both advocates and opponents of same-sex marriage who hold positions of 
government authority and political influence now and in the years to come.  
Respect for the expression of competing viewpoints, for the essential 
significance of federalism, deference to Congress’s enactment of DOMA, 
and recognition of the integrity of the limits of judicial review would be 
wise and prudential principles to follow now and in the years ahead.   
 
 244. Id. at 332; see also id. at 356 (“[T]olerance is the only viable way of preserving the 
liberal commitment to individual freedom in a genuine political community.”). 
 245. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
 246. “[D]iversity of ideas . . . is fundamental to the American system.” Bd. of Educ., 
Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 880 (1982) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Edwin Meese & Jennifer Marshall, 
Column, A Summer of Intolerance, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2012, 5:59 PM EST), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2012/10/07/meese-and-marshall-on-chick-fil-
a/1608773/?utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=culturewatch. 
 2012] INVOLUNTARY IMPORTS 825 
APPENDIX 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF SAME-SEX UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
GLOBALLY:  LEGAL STATUS—11 AUGUST 2012247 
A.  Legal Allowance of Same-Sex Unions in the United States248 
Same-Sex Marriage Is Legal in Six U.S. States, the District of Columbia, 
and Two U.S. Indian Tribes (12%): 
 Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, 
Vermont; the District of Columbia; the Coquille Tribe of Oregon, 
and the Suquamish Tribe of Washington.249 
Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage Are Recognized in Ten U.S. 
States (20%): 
 California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New 
Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island , and Washington.250 
Same-Sex Domestic Relationships with Limited Benefits Allowed in Three 
U.S. States (6%): 
 Colorado, Maine, and Wisconsin.251 
 
 247. Cf. Recognition of Same-Sex Couples Worldwide, LAMBDA LEGAL (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/fs_recognition-of-
same-sex-couples-worldwide_1.pdf; Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, LAMBDA 
LEGAL (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/nationwide-status-
same-sex-relationships.html. 
 248. See Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, supra note 247; see also Same-
Sex Marriage in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-sex_
marriage_in_the_United_States (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 249. The legislatures of Washington and Maryland also have passed bills to legalize 
same-sex marriage, but citizen petition processes in each state have been invoked to put the 
measures on the ballot to allow voter approval or rejection.  Unless rejected by a majority of 
the voters in November 2012, the bills will become law. See Matthew Brown, Both sides of 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate Focusing on Family, DESERET NEWS, (July 13, 2012, 9:24 PM), 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/print/765589755/Both-sides-of-same-sex-marriage-
debate-focusing-on-family.html.  Also in November 2012, a voter petition will be on the 
ballot in Maine which, if it passes, will legalize same-sex marriage there. See Maine Same-
Sex Marriage Question, Question 1 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA,  http://ballotpedia.org/
wiki/index.php/Maine_Same-Sex_Marriage_Question_%282012%29 (last visited Oct. 20, 
2012). 
 250. The Maryland and Washington civil union laws may be effectively displaced or 
upgraded by the same-sex marriage bills currently passed but awaiting voter veto or 
ratification in November 2012. See id. 
 251. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-22-105, 24-50-603 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§§ 2710, et seq. (2008); WIS. STAT. §§ 765, 770.01, et seq. (2010). 
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B.  Legal Rejection of Same-Sex Unions in the United States252 
Same-Sex Marriage Is Prohibited in Thirty-One States (62%): 
 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.253 
Same-Sex Civil Unions Equivalent to Marriage Are Prohibited in Twenty 
U.S. States (40%): 
 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Same-Sex Marriage Is Denied by Constitution, Statute or Appellate 
Decision in At Least Forty States: 
 All states prohibit same-sex marriage except the six that have 
legalized same-sex marriage and Maryland, New Mexico, Rhode 
Island, and Washington. 
 
 In states where same-sex marriage has been on the ballot, the 
people have decisively rejected same-sex marriage. The total vote 
rejecting same-sex marriage in votes on the thirty-one state 
marriage amendments combined is over 60 percent.254 
C.  Legal Allowance of Same-Sex Unions Globally255 
Same-Sex Marriage Is Permitted in Ten Nations: 
 Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, The Netherlands 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Portugal.256 
 
 252. See Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, supra note 247; see also Same-
Sex Marriage in the United States, supra note 248.  
 253. The most recent vote on a state marriage amendment was in May 2012 in North 
Carolina where voters adopted a state marriage amendment with over 61% of the popular 
vote. North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage, Amendment 1 (May 2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/North_Carolina_Same-Sex_Marriage,_Amendment_1
_%28May_2012%29 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  Additionally, the voters in Maine passed a 
“people’s veto” of a bill legalizing same-sex marriage that their legislature had enacted. See 
Maine Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 249. 
 254. Research on Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Initiatives (Sept. 2012) (on file with author). 
 255. See Recognition of Same-Sex Couples Worldwide, supra note 247; see also Status of 
Same-Sex Marriage, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Status_of_same-sex_marriage 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  
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Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage Are Allowed in Sixteen Other 
Nations: 
 Andorra, Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.257 
Same-Sex Partnerships (Formal but Not Equal to Marriage) Are Allowed in 
Six or More Nations: 
 Australia, Columbia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Israel. 
D.  Legal Rejection of Same-Sex Marriage Globally258 
Forty-six of 193 Sovereign Nations (24%) Have Constitutional Provisions 
Explicitly or Implicitly Defining Marriage as the Union of Man and 
Woman: 
 Armenia (art. 32), Azerbaijan (art. 34), Belarus (art. 32), Brazil (art. 
226), Bolivia (art. 63), , Bulgaria (art. 46), Burkina Faso (art. 23), 
Burundi (art. 29), Cambodia (art. 45), China (art. 49), Colombia 
(art. 42), Cuba (art. 43), Democratic Republic of the Congo (art. 
40), Ecuador (art. 38), Eritrea (art. 22), Ethiopia (art. 34), Gambia 
(art. 27), Honduras (art. 112), Hungary (art. M), Japan (art. 24), 
Latvia (art. 110), Lithuania (art. 31), Malawi (art. 22), Moldova 
(art. 48), Mongolia (art. 16), Montenegro (art. 71), Namibia (art. 
14), Nicaragua (art. 72), Panama (art. 58), Paraguay (arts. 49, 51, 
52), Peru (art. 5), Poland (art. 18), Romania (art. 44), Rwanda (art. 
26), Serbia (art. 62), Seychelles (art. 32), Spain (art. 32),259 Sudan 
(art. 15), Suriname (art. 35), Swaziland (art. 27), Tajiksistan (art. 
 
 256. Same-sex marriage is allowed in subdivisions of some other nations (e.g., certain 
states in the U.S., Mexico City).  A case specific ruling in Brazil recognized same-sex 
marriage rejecting sexual orientation discrimination. See Marilla Brocchetto & Luciani 
Gomes, Same-Sex Unions Recognized by Brazil’s High Court, CNN WORLD (May 5, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-05/world/brazil.same.sex.unions_1_civil-unions-gay-
couples-homosexual-couples?_s=PM:WORLD.  South Africa enacted “Civil Unions” which 
can be can be created by way of “marriage” and can be called “marriages,” but the Marriage 
Act was not amended and only allows male-female marriage. See Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=67843).  
Some nations may recognize foreign same-sex marriages but not allow domestic same-sex 
marriages. 
 257. Some subdivisions (provinces, states, territories, as in Australia, the United States, 
Greenland, etc.) also recognize marriage equivalent same-sex civil unions.  Some nations, 
such as Denmark, may allow both same-sex marriage and same-sex civil unions or 
partnerships. 
 258. See Recognition of Same-Sex Couples Worldwide, supra note 247; see also Status of 
Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 255.  
 259. While the constitutional text appears to prohibit same-sex marriage, the legislature 
passed a law allowing same-sex marriage.  The constitutionality of the law has been under 
judicial review for many years, calling into question the process and integrity of the system. 
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33), Turkmenistan (art. 25), Uganda (art. 31), Ukraine (ark. 51), 
Venezuela (art. 77), Vietnam (art. 64). 
